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An American Empire -- Part 3


By Jude Wanniski
Supply-Side University
August 24, 1995


A central task of the members of this American Empire, which of course
includes every nation on earth, is to sort out the rules of intervention
in the new world order. It is nothing more than a matter of deciding
questions of jurisdiction. We know within our own United States that it
makes little sense to send the Marines into Manhattan to settle a family
feud. The neighbors have first jurisdiction, then the precinct police,
then the borough police, the state police, the national guard, and
finally, when all else fails, the federal armed forces. If we had kept
these jurisdictional lines clear, Waco and Ruby Ridge might not have
happened. In the Gulf War, there was not support for U.S. intervention
until Kuwait’s neighbors -- particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt -- roused
themselves and cited an Iraqi aggression that seemed sure to spread. Even
then, President Bush carefully rounded up our allies in Europe, asked for
congressional approval, and gave Saddam one last chance to withdraw before
he pulled the trigger. The jurisdiction made sense and the local police
made it clear they could not contain the outlaw aggressor. It thus seemed
our national security was sufficiently at stake to warrant deployment of
troops and treasure.

In writing of the "national security" concept as it emerged in WWII,
Yergin observed that it is "not a given, not a fact, but a perception, a
state of mind."

And what characterizes the concept of national security? It postulates
the interrelatedness of so many different political, economic, and
military factors that developments halfway around the globe are seen
to have automatic and direct impact on America’s core interests.
Virtually every development in the world is perceived to be
potentially crucial. An adverse turn of events anywhere endangers the
United States. Problems in foreign relations are viewed as urgent and
immediate threats. Thus, desirable foreign policy goals are translated
into issues of national survival, and the range of threats becomes
limitless. The doctrine is characterized by expansiveness, a tendency
to push the subjective boundaries of security outward to more and more
areas, to encompass more and more geography and more and more
problems. It demands that the country assume a posture of military
preparedness; the nation must be on permanent alert. There was a new
emphasis on technology and armed force. Consequent institutional
changes occurred. All of this leads to a paradox: the growth of
American power did not lead to a greater sense of assuredness, but to
an enlargement of the range of perceived threats that must urgently be
confronted.

In the Balkans, neither American jurisdiction nor its national security is
at all obvious. The neighbors cannot even agree that Serbia committed
aggression against Bosnia. Indeed, in 1991, U.S. Secretary of State James
Baker III explicitly labeled the dispute a civil war, citing a parallel
with our own, in which President Abraham Lincoln refused to recognize the
right of the Confederate States to self-determination. Democracy will not
work if ethnic or religious minorities can opt out of a democratic
federation when it becomes inconvenient to stick around. The Wilsonian
idea of self-determination is antithetical to that of Lincoln, which
requires a family to debate an issue until it is worked out instead of
splintering into smaller and smaller nation-states.

In an unpublished monograph written in 1992, Nationalism and the State,
Reuven Brenner of McGill University in Montreal noted the trouble the
Wilsonian idea has caused, having "found its way into the United Nation’s
1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law, with a predictable
unsatisfactory distinction between the right of self-determination and the
right of secession." According to Brenner, the idea originally took hold
in the Wilson administration for two reasons. First, was the hope that
"the new nation-states emerging from the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian
empire would counter-balance the German nation-state." Second, was the
hope that "nationalism as an idea of linking people, establishing loyalty
and achieving international recognition of political legitimacy, would
prove to be a strong competitor to the communist doctrine. After all, the
latter also sought to link people, demand their loyalty, and obtain
political legitimacy -- but was based on the notion that allegiance to
social classes should dominate those of ethnicity, religion, language,
culture."

The internationally recognized principle may even have made things
worse by raising expectations of any group which had any grievances,
and who could now appeal in the name of "self-determination" to the
new Great Powers (which, when it was in their interests, were happy to
comply). Such expectations could only start conflicts or prevent them
from being settled more quickly. Events leading to World War I showed
how this happened in the past. [Bosnia] shows how this same process is
happening before our eyes.

As much as the GOP congressional leadership would love to intervene in
Bosnia, to reward the Muslims and punish the Serbs, it has been correct
for President Bill Clinton to hesitate. To intervene without jurisdiction
makes the United States the aggressor, "Americanizing" the war, as
President Clinton, the British, the French and the Russians have
understood. As in the dispute between China and Taiwan, a logical approach
to the strife in the Balkans is to stand by until we are asked to
intervene by one party or the other to offer our diplomatic skills.
In the July 31 National Review, former U.K. Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher offered a brief essay on "Why America Must Remain Number One."

Her fears are of a vague Orwellian future if the United States does not
remain the dominant power atop the global power pyramid, with the dark
influences of a future "Europe" leading the way, "a fully fledged state
with its own flag, anthem, army, parliament, government, currency, and
eventually, one supposes, people. I am not alone in warning that this
could stimulate both the United States and Japan to safeguard themselves
by forming similar protectionist empires. The world might then drift
toward an Orwellian future of Oceania, Eurasia and Eastasia -- three
mercantilist world empires on increasingly hostile terms."

Well, yes, but the arguments play against contrived fears, rather than
genuine opportunities. Implicit in Lady Thatcher’s comments, after all, is
a British desire to guide the United States in its new imperial role, from
its long experience in that occupation. She would have us lead an Atlantic
superbloc, remaining dominant over this brooding, restless "Europe," which
means keeping our "legions" stationed there "for the foreseeable future."
Thus, if we contain Europe with London’s help, "America remains the
dominant partner in a united West, [and] then the West can continue to be
the dominant power in the world as a whole." The West will contain the
East. Somehow, this kind of imperial style seems much more regal and
condescending than what an American imperium should be contemplating.
At one time I thought it might take another century or so for the world’s
political leaders to work out questions of jurisdiction in this new
Unipolar world. However, the masses of ordinary people seem to be doing it
themselves, always pushing in the direction of orderly and logical spheres
of influence and responsibility. The Great Powers used to work at
balancing power, but the drive of ordinary people to improve upon
civilization inevitably overwhelmed the dynastic leaders who played at
these great games. The great opportunity in this new beginning of history
rests with the ability of our country to do the balancing with wisdom and
magnanimity, with democratic consultation rather than noble condescension.
The United States, after all, is unique itself in the family of nations.
It is the only nation that began as a state, one that brought forth a new
nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the principle that all men
are created equal. The success of this experiment, which has drawn from a
leadership pool that contains the children of every nation on earth, is
now in a position to teach and guide the world at large. It is a
benevolent American Empire that is now our responsibility, one that should
hold back its threats of military might in order to influence by example.

 

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