By Charles V. Peña
Cato Insitute
October 20, 2002


The new "National Security Strategy of the United States of America" released by
the Bush administration at the end of September talks about the need "to stop
rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use
weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and
friends." One of the responses to this threat is the "development of an
effective missile defense system."

But given that the new strategy also asserts that deterrence may not work
against rogue states and terrorists and, therefore, that the United States will
act preemptively -- if necessary -- "against such emerging threats before they
are fully formed," a logical question arises: Why does the United States need a
missile defense against rogue states?

By definition, rogue states do not currently possess long-range missiles -- that
could be armed with weapons of mass destruction -- capable of reaching the
United States. If the new U.S. strategy is simply to eliminate the threat before
it is fully formed, then rogue states would never acquire the capability to
attack the United States, nor would they be able to pass such capability on to
terrorists. If that were the case, then the need for a missile defense that
could cost hundreds of billions of dollars would seemingly be obviated. Such
potential savings are especially important in light of the fact that the
Pentagon has spent over $100 billion since President Reagan challenged the
technical community to render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete in 1983, but
an operationally effective missile defense is still to be proven.

Of course, the real reason the administration wants to pursue missile defense is
not so much to protect America per se (although that is largely how advocates
couch their argument and rationale), but to protect U.S. forces so they can
engage in military intervention around the world. Such thinking is not set forth
in the new National Security Strategy. But it is explicit in a document many
consider the "blueprint" for the new strategy: "Rebuilding America's Defenses,"
a report by The Project of the New American Century published in September 2000
and whose many contributors include people in key policy positions in the Bush
administration, including Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and
Undersecretary of State John Bolton. This report calls for the development and
deployment of global missile defenses "to provide a secure basis for U.S. power
projection around the world."

So it's not really the intercontinental ballistic missiles that rogue states
currently don't have and aren't likely to develop and deploy for perhaps a
decade or more that has the administration worried. It's the short-range
missiles (like Scuds) that rogue states already have. Why? Because if equipped
with nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads, such missiles could be a
credible deterrent to U.S. military intervention with conventional forces. And
although it's all dressed up with the rationale of extending liberty, democracy,
and freedom around the globe (except, of course, in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan),
the new national security strategy is really about a Pax Americana enforced by
dominant military power and an ever-expanding security perimeter with U.S.
forces deployed around the globe.

It never seems to occur to those bent on pursuing such a strategy that the
result will be increased resentment and animosity towards what is perceived by
the rest of the world as an imperialist America. Indeed, a recent poll shows
that Arabs generally like American freedoms, values, and culture. But they
dislike the United States based on its foreign policies. This sentiment is
echoed in other polls in countries around the world. But the conclusion is lost
on American policymakers: The United States needs to stop meddling in the
internal affairs of regions and countries around the world, especially when it
does not threaten U.S. national security interests. I.e., When the territorial
integrity, national sovereignty, or liberty of the United States is at risk, or
it becomes necessary to prevent the emergence of an expansionist hegemonic
power.

Ultimately, the global missile defense sought by the administration is a shield
for a quixotic crusade using military force to build a better and safer world
based on American values and interests. But this strategy will have the perverse
effect of making the United States less secure by sowing the seeds of hate and
vehement anti-American sentiment that could erupt in more terrorist violence.

And a missile defense, no matter how effective, will not protect Americans from
terrorists using easier and cheaper means to inflict mass casualties -- witness
9/11.

Charles V. Peña is senior defense policy analyst at the Cato Institute.