The Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran in 1941 would have been less essential to
Allied war purposes had the Iranian State Railway not existed. For unwittingly
Reza Shah Pahlevi, who opened the $140,000,000 line on 26 August 1939 after
more than seven years of construction, had forged in the ISR a powerful weapon
against the very Germans whose accepted friendship hastened the wartime
occupation and his abdication. As a ready-made link between Western Hemisphere
sources of supply and the Soviet battle lines, the railway hauled three out of
every five tons of supplies delivered through the Corridor to Soviet receiving
points by combined British and American effort. Virtually all of those three
tons were delivered to the Russians during the period of American operation.
The figures are 5,149,376 long tons, 2,989,079 long tons, and 2,'737,677 long
tons.1

The railway operation was impressive; but the totals do not make real its
sheer mass of steel, manpower, and planning. Other figures indicate the
extraordinary rate of increase. Before the Anglo-Soviet occupation the railway
could haul 200 tons a day. During the period of all-British operation for
which figures are available the daily average haul of Russian-aid freight was
661 long tons. The daily average haul in the peak month of British operation (
September 1942 ) was 790 long tons of Russian-aid cargoes. In the period of
interim Anglo-American operation ( January .through March 1943 ) the daily
average of Russian-aid cargo hauled climbed to 921 long tons. The daily
average for the whole period of American operation (April 1943 through May
1945 ) was 3,397 long tons of Russian-aid freight. Nor was this the full
measure of the capacity to which the ISR was brought. In the last five months
of British operation, August through December 1942, the daily average of all
freight hauled was approximately 1,530 long tons, a notable improvement over
the capacity inherited by the British in 1941. For the whole period of
American operation this figure
[331]

rose to 5,336, an average which reflects not only the limited accomplishments
at the beginning, but also the peak performance of 1944. The daily average for
that year was 6,489 long tons, and for July, the top month of 1944, 7,520.2
A comparable increase in capacity, achieved in peacetime by a well-equipped
modern railway under the blessings of a management beholden to none but its
own judgment, would be hard to find in the annals of railroading. Yet the
performance wrung from the ISR between 1941 and 1945 was marked up on the
record in the face of the usual Persian Corridor headaches: a kitchenful of
cooks stirring the broth to the loud accompaniment of arguments on precedence,
proper handling of the ladle, the ingredients, and determination of the
appropriate rental owed to the owner of the pot and of the cook or cooks
liable for its payment.

For this reason the tangle of agreements and arrangements, not to speak of
tensions, that existed among the authorities is as important a part of the
railway story as the record of day-to-day operations. Neither aspect of the
story sufficiently explains the secret of the prodigies of performance that,
among them, the Americans, the British, the Iranians, and the Russians
extracted from the ISR. Certainly the prodigal expenditure of American
material resources in expansion of rolling stock and improvement of
maintenance of way, operating facilities, and methods greased the wheels;
while on the other side multiple authority and differing national aims and
temperaments operated as a brake. From the moment of the Anglo-Soviet
occupation the ISR was destined to carry the main burden of Russian-aid
traffic. When, after a year of British operation, the Combined Chiefs turned
the job over to the United States Army and coolly raised .the target to 6,000
long tons daily for all cargoes, the grim fact was that, from then on, the ISR
would have to live up to expectations, would have to carry loads undreamed of.
It is perhaps because of this necessity that all other factors appear as
secondary explanations of the ultimate feat. The necessity itself provided the
key to the result. The ability of the railway to carry so much of the burden
of Russian-aid tonnage was essential to the success of the supply program. The
railway had to succeed.

And it did, but not without dust and heat: the dust of minutes and memoranda;
the heat of the day's work on the line and in the yards. The peculiar nature
of the railway operation, involving as it did complicated adjustments at the
diplomatic as well as the military
[332]

level, overshadowed all merely operational problems. These adjustments,
whether they concerned military command, or whether they involved national
pride or prerogatives, in essence were adjustments of authority.
One should not give a man a job to do without clothing him with the requisite
power and discretion to do it. Normally there is no separation between
authority and responsibility. But the four-power partnership in the Corridor
posed abnormal conditions which affected the railway task no less than other
parts of the supply program. In September 1942 the Combined Chiefs, as told in
Chapter X, gave to the Americans responsibility for transport operations while
leaving undisturbed the primary British authority over security and movements.
In the interest of efficient operation it became necessary for the commanders
in the field to effect, by delegation of authority and other adjustments, as
close an identity of authority and responsibility as the abnormal Corridor
situation permitted. How this was done for the transport task as a whole
(trucks, ports, railway) was told in Chapter XI. The effort to harness
authority and responsibility into one team is a main thread in the story of
the railway.

Authority and Responsibility

The basic charter under which all wartime activity on the ISR was carried on
was the Tri-Partite Treaty; but as a guide to railway matters its grants of
authority to the British and Soviet Armies were general. It did not specify
how their control of Iranian communications would apply to the specific
business of running the railway. Moreover, as the treaty was not signed until
January 1942 and as the railway problem pressed for action if not for solution
from the moment of occupation the previous August, there was no time for
dispassionate consideration of ways and means. The British and Soviets
proceeded, under the preliminary terms accepted by Iran in September 1941, to
exercise control of communications within their respective zones. It cannot be
said that this was a deliberately chosen policy, although the separate
assumption of operating and supervisory responsibility for a railway thus
arbitrarily divided into two segments at Tehran established a precedent which
had the full force of chosen policy, and which, as time went on, proved the
fixed and never altered basic operating plan for the railroad. In the
remaining months of 1941 this basic decision-which-was-notdecided was taken,
as it were, by default.

The alternatives, as they appeared from time to time in the endless
discussions among the Corridor partners, were two: operation of the
[333]

line as a whole from Gulf to Caspian by a single responsible authority with
power to take decisions; or a division of the line at Tehran with
co-ordination to be provided by a joint operating commission representing
Iran, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The first, the logical solution,
failed of adoption whenever it was proposed because it was incompatible with
the basic Corridor situation-a partnership of expediency without unified local
command. The second was a compromise whose experimental execution dwindled
into early oblivion.

From the beginning the United States was drawn into both alternatives as well
as the de facto Anglo-Soviet arrangement. Churchill's appeal a few days after
the occupation for American locomotives, rolling stock, and technical advice
bulked large in the War Department's decision to establish the Iranian
Mission, the selection as its first chief of General Wheeler, a railroad
expert, his choice as civilian contractor of Foley Brothers, Inc., an
engineering firm experienced in railroad construction and, above all, the
designation of the ISR as an approved lend-lease project months before the
designation of Iran as a nation eligible for lend-lease aid. When in September
1941 the lend-lease authorities were unable to find a suitable top railroad
man to advise Harry Hopkins on the equipment needed to meet the
ChurchillBeaverbrook requests, the matter of strengthening the ISR was handed
over to the War Department and by it referred to General Wheeler and his new
Iranian Mission. The commissioning of John A. Gillies, General Manager of the
Santa Fe Railway, as a lieutenant colonel and his dispatch to Iran in October
to investigate and report followed.3

The United States thus assumed from the beginning responsibilities in the
railway task without receiving authority for their execution. It undertook to
supply equipment and technical advice to be used at the discretion of the
Anglo-Soviet Armies whose authority was not only split-each in its zone of
Iran-but was in turn derived from the Iranian Government as owner of the ISR.
It was some time before the ambiguities of the situation resolved themselves
into a series of understandings, some definite, some no more definite than an
absence of objection by one party to the actions of another. In September 1941
the Soviet Ambassador at Tehran proposed that each occupying power operate the
rail lines within its respective zone of occupation. There was no formal
agreement to that effect, but separate operations proceeded as if there were.
The British commissioned Sir Godfrey Rhodes, General Manager of the Kenya and
Uganda Railways and Harbors, a brigadier and flew him early in October to
Tehran to become director
[334]

of transportation; but when the Russians established a Soviet railway
headquarters at Tehran it was reported to Washington that the British in Iran
viewed the act with some dismay and feared that divided operating control
would make for reduced railway capacity and would cause complications with the
Iranian railway administration.4

Before the end of 1941 both alternatives to divided operating control appeared
on the scene. The suggestion was made for a .joint operating commission; and,
early in November, Lord Beaverbrook expressed the hope that the United States
would operate the ISR. The reactions to the latter differed. General Wheeler
reported that informal conversations with the Iranian Prime Minister, the
Iranian Foreign Minister, and the Soviet Ambassador at Tehran indicated a
favorable attitude, but that the British transportation directorate in Iran
was opposed. On the other hand, the British War Office in London, in a message
in January 1942 requesting India's views, noted that operation of the railroad
by Americans as allies was a different proposition from operation by Americans
as nonbelligerents, the American status at the time of the Beaverbrook
proposal. London requested Indian headquarters to consider the matter from the
point of view of (1) the use that could be made elsewhere of British personnel
released by American operation, and ( 2 ) the psychological effect on the
British forces in Iran who were developing the railway of having it handed
over to Americans. When India referred the proposal to Baghdad for an opinion,
the response was favorable to American operation of the ISR. Baghdad said,
"Psychological effect on our transportation personnel should not be taken into
account. Operation Persian Railway by Americans extremely desirable every
point of view. We should discard all stipulations and give Americans complete
control."5

This opinion might have carried more weight in British councils had it been
advanced as a matter of general principle; but the Baghdad message, by
asserting that British transportation personnel in Iran replaced by Americans
would be "invaluable for employment in Iraq," showed that its advocacy of
American operation was colored by the pressing need of the British forces in
Iraq for increased strength, and was not necessarily a considered opinion as
to the best way of solving the railway problem in Iran.

At Washington caution marked discussions between the State and War
Departments, and pessimism a memorandum by War Plans Divi-
[335]

sion which, while accurately assessing present difficulties, can hardly be
blamed for not achieving equal accuracy regarding the future. Noting that the
"Southern area served by the railroad is unhealthful," the paper went on to
state:

U.S. civilian or military personnel, not acclimated, would not be efficient or
effective .... Bad living conditions, shortage of water, unsatisfactory legal
status and difficult working conditions make it questionable if competent U.S.
Civilian railroad technicians could be retained . . . . Should U.S. Railroad
units operate Trans-Iranian Railroad, the next logical step would be for U.S.
Quartermaster units to operate the docks and U.S. Quartermaster truck
companies to do the trucking. This could only be justified if it were
contemplated that U.S. combat troops were later going to operate in this area.
Since this is not the current plan, U.S. Army service troops should not be
provided for this duty.6

Both American chiefs of missions in the Middle East saw the logic behind the
proposed American operation. General Maxwell told his staff at Cairo that, to
obtain maximum efficiency uncomplicated by rivalries over controls, the
ultimate objective was American operation. General Wheeler, after conference
at New Delhi with the Acting Commander-in-Chief, India, and his staff,
reported that he shared British apprehension over divided (Anglo-Soviet)
control of the ISR. He urged American operation by an American staff, or, as
an alternative, a variant of the proposal for a joint supervisory committee
which would entrust supervision to a small American headquarters staff, an
arrangement which would require a high degree of co-operation by the British,
Soviet, and Iranian authorities. Along the lines expressed by the WPD
memorandum, Wheeler stated that the United States should come in only if the
ISR were to be used for delivery of large quantities of supplies for the USSR,
or for maintaining lame British

or American forces m northern Iran against Axis invasion. If these were not to
be the proposed uses of the railroad, then he recommended that the British and
Russians should work out their problems alone. Wheeler advised caution in
making big plans because he had been told by the Soviet Ambassador that Moscow
demanded only 2,000 motor trucks per month and 100 aircraft to be delivered by
the Persian Gulf route, and this did not place too heavy a strain upon the
railroad's capacities. Nevertheless, he concluded, because it might be
necessary for British and American troops to operate in northern Iran and the
Caucasus against Axis forces, some state of readiness of the railroad should
be provided. He. therefore recommended that if it should be
[336]

considered politically expedient to attempt to harmonize all interests, the
United States should offer to Britain and Russia to provide American
management with a small headquarters staff.7

Neither the Wheeler suggestion, designed to fit into the Corridor situation so
long as no extraordinary demands were to be made of the railroad, nor the
Beaverbrook suggestion, which would have required a radical alteration in the
basic Corridor situation, attracted sufficient strength to come into effect.
In both British and American camps, arguments pro and con canceled one another
out. But early in 1942, acting by request of the Tri-Partite powers, the
United States designated Colonel Gillies to act as "mediator" on a joint board
of representatives of Iran, Great Britain, and the USSR. Gillies served until
his death in line of duty on 28 February 1942. No successor was appointed.8
Early in 1942 a detailed document was negotiated upon a foundation of Iranian
proposals modified and extended by British and Soviet suggestions. Entitled
"Regarding the Affairs of the Ministry of Ways and Communications," it was
designed to establish a contractual relationship to govern British operation
of the ISR. As the agreement was never approved by top authorities, the
British proceeded under a simpler plan which they submitted to Iran but not to
the USSR. Meanwhile the Russians had been going their separate way in their
zone.9

Thus matters rocked along until mounting tonnages and global pressures
produced the crisis of midsummer 1942, one of whose resolutions, as told in
Chapter X, was the assignment of the operation of the British sector of the
ISR to the U.S. Army. It is recorded that when all the preliminaries were over
and Averell Harriman at Cairo told Prime Minister Churchill that the U.S. Army
was ready to undertake the assignment, some British officers once again
expressed alarm at putting control of an essential line of empire
communications into foreign (i. e., American) hands; whereat Churchill
dismissed the objection with the words, "And in what better hands could it
be?"10
[337]

American control, however, was at that time not contemplated, since the
Combined Chiefs' directive studiously avoided any modification of British
authority over movements and security. Operation and control were .to be in
different hands. American responsibilities had been enormously enlarged, but
once again it was responsibility without authority, an anomaly from every
point of view and one whose adverse effects upon operations called for the
prompt attention and vigorous negotiation which General Connolly gave to the
problem as soon as he arrived. If there had been in anybody's mind the thought
that the new American command was to be integrated with the British, or
subordinated to it, it soon become clear that the meshing of the two forces
would be much subtler than .that. Connolly wrote candidly in December 1942 to
Somervell:

. . . we are setting up our show on the Pershing pattern. This naturally does
not, and cannot be expected to, arouse any great degree of enthusiasm on the
part of our British cousins. They have been dominating the situation south of
Tehran and competing with the Russians in Tehran. It is understandable that
they want to keep a grip on all facilities and resources both for use during
the war and for afterward. Up to date our arguments with them on labor,
covered storage, supplies, etc., have been on a very friendly and cooperative
basis. The idea is gradually percolating that this is a part of the U.S.
Army-not part of the British Army.11

When, a few days after this letter was written, the first five thousand
American service troops reached Khorramshahr, the relation between the
American and British forces appeared to the Russians and Iranians to call for
explanation. As is told hereafter in Chapter XX, they inquired whether the
Americans, coming to Iran at British invitation, were to be considered as a
part of the British command, and whether, if they were not, their presence
prejudiced Iranian sovereignty and the rights enjoyed by the signatories to
the Tri-Partite Treaty. The prolonged diplomatic exchange which followed
provided the background against which negotiations to reconcile operational
responsibility and authority were carried on. "The next big argument," General
Connolly wrote in the letter just quoted, "is going to be over control of the
railroad." Its culmination was the "Joint Agreement between Persia and Iraq
Forces and the Persian Gulf Service Command for the Control of Movements in
Persia," signed 7 April 1943.12
[338]

By this agreement, which gave the American command effective control over
movements, the gap which separated responsibility and authority was
considerably narrowed and operational problems proportionately simplified. In
the course of the negotiations the old question of a unified rather than
divided operation of the railway line again made its appearance when the
American Ambassador at Moscow, Admiral William H. Standley, informed the
Department of State that he possessed information that Iran wished the United
States to take over not only the British sector but the Soviet sector as well.
The information, while indicative of a trend in Iranian thinking and
maneuvering, was, as General Connolly advised Washington, not accurate as to
official Iranian policy. The question was settled, at least for the time
being, by the decision of the Departments of State and War that, even should
the offer to entrust to the U.S. Army operation of the ISR from Gulf to
Caspian be forthcoming, it would be declined.13

The agreement on movements control made it possible for an independent
American command to work, by means of delegated authority, with rather than
under the British command. Since control of movements was essential to the
carrying out of American operational responsibility, the agreement with the
British proved, as Connolly reported after seven months' trial, "extremely
satisfactory."14 Yet it was little more than a detailed working arrangement in
the all-important field of allocations, priorities, and movements. Efforts
were therefore made to supplement it with other agreements defining the status
of the American command in the Corridor, and, more specifically, the degree to
which British responsibilities regarding the ISR were assumed by the U.S. Army
when it took over operation of the British sector of the line. Although the
negotiations to these ends were inconclusive they illustrate further some
problems inherent in a situation which by its nature precluded either unified
command or the exact definition of responsibilities.

The Power o f the Purse

As the Combined Chiefs' directive said nothing about railway finances, the
power of the purse figured prominently in the effort of the American command
to control effectively the operations it had undertaken. The basic and thorny
question focused upon British obligations
[339]

to the ISR. By agreement with the Iranian Government, the British had
guaranteed to it an annual net sum, or profit, equivalent to that earned by
the ISR between 21 March 1940 and 20 March 1941. The net revenue to Iran was
accordingly fixed at 103 million rials per annum (equivalent to $3,218,750) .
British Army freight was to receive a 50-percent concession in rates to be
agreed, and transit freight, which meant goods destined for the USSR, would
receive a 20-percent concession for all over 500,000 tons monthly. Capital
expenditures beyond normal expansion were to be borne by the Ally, British or
Soviet, making the demand for them; and the Allies contracted not to interfere
more than necessary with Iranian civilian needs.15

The guaranteed annual net profit was to be calculated after a balancing of
receipts and expenditures, with war-caused expenditures to be excluded from
the ISR's operating budget. The crux of the financing problem was freight
charges. At the beginning of the plan the UKCC was to pay freight charges
incurred for the USSR, the funds coming from the War Office, London, while the
British Army drew upon War Office funds paid out by PAI Force in Baghdad for
their own charges. After September 1943 the British Army paid all charges
except those for Iranian civil goods and USSR internal movements. In April
1944 this method was dropped and the British resorted to cash advances on the
tenth of each month to cover the difference between ISR civil earnings and the
amount needed for current operating expenses, such as wages. Very substantial
payments, totaling $14,782,727 as of 1 June 1945, were made by the ISR for
stores of British, U.S. lend-lease, and U.S. Army non-lend-lease origin.16
When the American command took over operations from the British in 1943, along
with the rolling stock came a complex of bookkeeping between the British Army
and the Iranian railway directorate

cash advances, expenditures, book credits, and adjustments-all involved in the
general financial arrangements under which British operations were conducted.
Exchanges of views as to American financial responsibilities were promptly
begun and continued until the lend-lease settlement with Great Britain in
March 1946. Throughout, British pressure was doggedly exerted to prevail upon
the United States to assume, as of 1 April 1943, "sole responsibility for
making
[340]

advances or meeting bills in the first instance" on the ISR.17 The British
felt moreover that this liability should be supplemented by American agreement
to pay the cost of all British as well as American internal traffic after 1
April in return for the British paying for their own and American traffic
before that date. The United States would thus find itself saddled with
liability for everybody's expenses plus the guarantee to Iran, and all this in
addition to the ever mounting costs of maintaining and operating the American
command in the Persian Corridor, which was already a heavy contribution toward
the joint war effort in that area.

But the cardinal consideration from the point of view of the American command
was not the cost involved in accepting the British proposal, for cost was not
reckoned in the American effort to bring aid to Russia. Acceptance of the
British financial liabilities toward the ISR would mean that American money
would go directly into American operations instead of being siphoned into them
via lend-lease to Britain. It was felt in the American command that taking
over the British financial responsibility would increase American operational
efficiency and authority by reducing the number of voices to be consulted over
policy. The power of the purse gave the British ultimate control over
operational matters whose cost (in American dollars) they could approve or
disapprove when it was chargeable to the British share in lend-lease. In
short, the Americans reasoned, if the money were to be spent anyhow, it was
simpler for it to pass directly from American hands to the ISR instead of from
Washington to Tehran via London.18 The American command therefore proceeded
for some time to negotiate with the British upon the basis of the Americans
taking over the British working agreement with the ISR. This involved not only
an American guarantee of a minimum annual sum to Iran, as proposed by General
Connolly on 21 July 1943, but American assumption of all costs, including USSR
transit freight, which exceeded ISR revenues. Tentative agreement was reached
along these lines, to be effective on 1 August. But on 19 July the Americans
informed Brigadier Rhodes that there would be a delay. As it turned out the
delay proved permanent.19

The crux of the opposition which Washington soon expressed was the Combined
Chiefs' directive (CCS 109/1) . This provided only
[341]

that the U.S. Army should serve in the place of the British Army in certain
undertakings in the Persian Corridor. It did not alter basic British
responsibilities or mention finance. Since financial matters lay at the heart
of control, General Marshall advised General Connolly that any alteration of
the financial arrangements existing at the assumption of American operational
responsibility would require the Combined Chiefs of Staff to reopen "the
entire question of responsibility for and control of the transport routes."20
General Connolly was therefore committed to continuing negotiations in the
financial field within the prescribed limits of the status quo as of the date
of CCS 109/1, as modified by the working agreement over movements signed with
the British in April 1943. And there were the other arrangements to be made to
define American relations with the Corridor partners. Respecting these
negotiations, opinion at Washington was divided as to whether they should
proceed at the military level or the diplomatic level, and whether unilateral
agreements or a general pact would be desirable. In time all talks merged with
the negotiations over final settlement when the Americans, their mission over,
returned the ISR to the British.

Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammad Sa'ed directed a stream of
inquiries, expostulations, and expressions of indignation at United States
Minister Dreyfus, who in due course transmitted some of them to General
Connolly. In April 1943 Mr. Sa'ed wanted to know whether the new working
agreement between the Americans and the British had been consented to by the
Russians; in May he deplored the chaos resulting from ill-defined operational
control of the ISR; in July he demanded a direct Iranian-American agreement;
in August he complained that the American railway director, Colonel Yount,
without negotiation had presented to the railway administration for signature
an operating agreement; and he ventured to point out that no matter how eager
the government of Iran was to co-operate in friendship with its Allies, the
ISR was the property of Iran and nothing, no action, should take place save
under "the stipulations of a general agreement to be signed by the Governments
of Iran and the United States."21

Mr. Sa'ed was reassured: that the United States was merely sub-
[342]

stituting for Great Britain in the matter of the railway, and that, as the
British had informed the government of Iran, nothing had affected British
obligations under the Tri-Partite Treaty; that, instead of chaos, General
Connolly was able to report ( 21 June) improving tonnages for the USSR and for
the Iranian civilian economy as well and harmonious relations between Colonel
Yount and Hossain Nafisi, DirectorGeneral of the ISR, and to explain ( 23
August) that the administrative agreement referred to in one of the diplomatic
communications was actually a bulletin on personnel procedure, adopted after
long conferences, and in agreement, with Nafisi; and finally, that Nafisi had
been informed on 3 August that the working agreement with the British "will be
subordinate to the final covenant between the U.S. Army and the ISR."
The files abound in drafts and counterdrafts for such a covenant, and the
summer of 1943 witnessed simultaneous discussions of three sorts: between the
Americans and the British, on the military level, to determine financial
obligations; between the Americans and the Iranians, on the political level,
to discuss a bilateral railway agreement (perhaps as a part of a larger
agreement as to American status in Iran) ; and four-power discussions toward a
railway agreement.22 While Connolly was thus attempting to be, like "Mr.
Cerberus, three gentlemen at once," in Mrs. Malaprop's phrase, the War
Department in August 1943 reached a conclusion and advised him as follows:
First, the Anglo-Iranian arrangements were so complex the United States could
not hope to do them justice if the British should withdraw altogether in the
matter of the railway. Second, since the United States was not a party to the
Tri-Partite Treaty, it was inappropriate for it to join in a four-power
railway agreement. Third, Connolly should negotiate an operating contract with
the ISR, obtaining therefor the concurrence of the governments of the United
Kingdom, USSR, and Iran. Fourth, the British should continue, as in 1941-1942,
to bear the ultimate financial responsibility.23

To some extent the War Department's policy decisions were helpful, for they
cleared the air with regard to what financial liabilities the United States
would assume. Thenceforth, General Connolly and his fiscal adviser, Col. John
B. Stetson, Jr., could be as adamant in their assertion that the U.S. Army was
agent only, and not financially liable, as were the British in insisting that
as of 1 April 1943 a new deal in finances ought to take place. General
Connolly may have been reluc-
[343]

tant to proceed with the delicate palavers prerequisite to an operating
contract signed with the ISR and blessed by Britain and the USSR, for, as
already noted, he was satisfied with the working agreement with PAI Force.
Meanwhile, it appears that the British desired settlement of railway matters
at the political level, and Minister Dreyfus concurred.24 It must be supposed
that the British took this position, not because they were dissatisfied with
the successful movements agreement which had been worked out at the military
level, but because of the financial stand now being taken by the Americans.
The view of the Department of State was therefore communicated by Dreyfus to
Stetson at American military headquarters, through quotation of a telegram
from the Acting Secretary of State to Dreyfus, as follows:

If it is necessary to conclude an agreement on a political level covering the
operation of the trans-Iranian Railway, you are authorized to initiate and
negotiate such an agreement satisfactory to the American military authorities.
While War Department orally concurs in this, it nevertheless has expressed a
preference for an agreement by the military authorities concerned.
To this Stetson replied in part as follows:

Understand, of course, that it was the view of PGSC to negotiate this
agreement on the military level and not on the political level. The War
Department, however, refused to PGSC authority to make any financial
commitments binding the United States with respect the railroad.
In view of this decision, I informed the British that the entire financial
responsibility was theirs, and that we as operators of the railroad are acting
for them in the position of agent. They have elected, therefore, to make the
agreement with respect to the railroad on the diplomatic level.25
Actually the situation was not essentially changed. The British maintained
their financial convictions, but in March 1944 the War Department indicated
that it would be willing to credit the cost of U.S. Army freight by entering
it on the books as reverse lend-lease, provided the British paid it in the
first instance.26

But when on 31 May 1945 representatives of the British and American Armies sat
down together to discuss the return of the ISR to the British, it was found
not only that the British still expected the Americans to pay for everything
after 1 April 1943 but that the British proposed stopping their interim
payments to the ISR after 30 June 1945 and that they would regard any
subsequent breakdown as a point Allied responsibility.27
[344]

Up to 1 July 1945 the cash advanced by the British to the ISR was more than
twenty million dollars less than the ISR claimed the British owed for payment
of USSR transit freight charges. If the ISR would agree to a reduction of the
rates, as proposed but never settled, to three tenths of a rial per ton
kilometer, then .the British had overpaid by more than three and one half
million dollars. As such overpayment did not cover costs of delivered stores
and all operating expenses, there was a considerable gap to be made up to
reach the guarantee of one hundred and three million rials net annual income.
These matters were adjusted on paper by discovering and agreeing upon a
freight rate that would even matters up pretty much as they were. So much for
the British obligation to the ISR. After 1 July 1945 the British proposed that
.the United States, the USSR, and themselves pay the ISR separately for bills
incurred; but the Americans pointed out that unless the British gave the ISR
sufficient funds to settle its accounts with the United States for heavy
purchases of supplies, stores, and equipment, against which account the United
States had withheld payments to the ISR for command internal freight charges,
then the United States, while paying off the ISR account, might not be paid in
return.28

In view of the difficulties which beset a financial settlement limited to the
railway, the American command felt that the total effort of the United States
Army in the Persian Corridor was relevant. Such a factor as American
improvement and maintenance of highways over and above its obligations under
the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive should offset British claims for
compensation for freight charges on the railway.29 Since the question appeared
incapable of solution in the field, it passed to higher authority and was
ultimately swallowed up in the over-all lend-lease settlement between the
British and American Governments. In this final settlement a notation appears
that a British claim for compensation from the United States for twenty-five
million dollars for USSR transit freight carried over the ISR was disallowed
by the United States.30

There is a bright side to the tedious record of all these negotiations in
which the Americans, for the sake of efficient operations, strove to attain as
close an identity between responsibility and authority as the Corridor
situation permitted. If that situation could have been altered
[345]

by negotiation to provide unified operation of the ISR from Gulf to Caspian or
even to invest the American command with primary authority as well as
responsibility, the operational problem would have been noticeably eased and
the results achieved even more striking than those summarized at the beginning
of this chapter. But it is a commentary upon Anglo-American temperaments that,
during the years when American and British officialdom strove in paper after
paper and talk after talk to determine who could properly do what and who
should pay for what, their colleagues were running the trains, doing the job,
delivering the goods to the Russians. Nevertheless, as that part of the story
now unfolds, the murmur of innumerable conferences and the rustle of carbon
copies will still be heard above the clang of freight cars in the assembly
yards and the deep-throated whistle of the diesels echoing in the high
mountains of Iran.

The Americans Take Over

The railway itself is a notable engineering accomplishment.31 Its
single-track, standard-gauge main line extends 865 miles from the southern
terminus of Bandar Shahpur, a tidewater port at the northern end of the
Persian Gulf, to Bandar Shah on the southeastern shore of the Caspian Sea.
(See Map 4 ) Within its span many phases of engineering and railroad
construction are combined in somewhat unusual concentration.
Soon after completion of the main line, construction began on two branches. In
1939 the railway extended a branch northwest from Tehran toward Tabriz; in
1941 this line had passed Zenjan and was carried on to Mianeh in 1942, a total
distance of 272 miles. Some work was done west of Mianeh, but the plans based
on the former Shah's insistence upon driving the line from there straight
through, rather than around large hill masses, proved too costly and the
project withered. The other branch, running eastward from Garmsar through
Samnan to Shahrud for a distance of 196 miles, was placed in service in 1940.
In 1942 the British, purely as a military measure, constructed two more
branches. One 77 miles in length, extended from Ahwaz to Khorramshahr; the
other was a 27-mile extension from this line to Cheybassi, lighterage port
up-river from Tanuma and opposite Margil, in the port area of Basra.
[346]

From Bandar Shahpur the line runs northward for 69 miles, across marshland and
the Khuzistan Desert, to Ahwaz, crossing a 3,512-foot bridge over the Karun
River at that point. Following the course of the Ab-i-Diz River, the railroad
continues northwest for 87 miles across the desert to Andimeshk in the Zagros
foothills, where it embarks on the first of two of the most dramatic railroad
sections in the world.

The Zagros Mountains are forbiddingly devoid of vegetation, their lonely,
rocky facades utterly bleak, the ravines between the profusion of their peaks
sheer and desolate. North of Andimeshk as far as Dorud, 130 miles distant, the
railroad hugs the course of the Ab-i-Diz, crossing it many times in that
section, high in the mountains. The railroad plunges through tunnel after
tunnel-135 of them in one stretch of 165 miles-and permits glimpse:; of
breathtaking sweep as it emerges time after time to skirt the brinks of deep
and precipitous canyons. The first American soldiers traveling north to their
station in Tehran, in January 1943, found no comfort in the fact that the
locomotives hauling them over the single-track railroad were without
headlights in this succession of tunnels. There are many bridges and there are
miles of retaining walls of massive design and galleried sheds to protect the
track from snow and landslides. North of Dorud the line ascends to an altitude
of 7,272 feet and, emerging upon a high plateau, reaches Sultanabad, 91 miles
away, and Qum, 87 miles beyond Sultanabad. From there it is 111 miles to the
capital city, Tehran.

From Tehran, the main line turns abruptly southeast for 71 miles to Garmsar,
skirting the high wall of the Elburz Mountains. At Garmsar, the line veers
northeast again, entering a lofty pass in the Elburz and climbing to a height
of 6,927 feet. In this 65-mile section the railroad performs veritable
gymnastics, with spiraled switchbacks, tunnels which burrow through the rock
in sweeping curves, and, at one point, a corkscrew climb in which four
elevations of track lift the railway with a grade of one in 36. One hundred
and fifty-three miles from the summit in the Elburz lies Bandar Shah, which is
85 feet below sea level.

Beginning at Tehran, the Soviet sector of the ISR comprised 757 miles of line
running east from the capital to Bandar Shah and Shahrud, and west to Mianeh.
The British sector extended for 680 miles of main and branch line southward
from Tehran, through the mountains and across the desert to the Gulf. Over
this route the first American railroad troops rode to Tehran on a train drawn
by a little prewar Ferrostaal locomotive with copper firebox and brightly
trimmed wheels. Their journey was enlivened when, in the wilds of the Zagros
Mountains, they had to get out and push the train up the more difficult
grades. That ludicrous first experience was to fade into the incredible
[347]

past as the great diesels from beyond the Atlantic took over the rails in Iran
and the trains lengthened and the tonnages grew.

One year before, while the newly arrived British were working to increase the
prewar capacity of the ISR from its 200-ton daily level, General Wheeler had
estimated that, using existing inadequate equipment, American operation might
raise capacity for all types of cargo to 600 tons daily, capable of increase
to 1,800 tons by the addition of American rolling stock. The British had set
themselves a goal of 2,000 tons daily to be reached by April 1942.32
With a military operating and supervisory staff which reached a maximum of 120
officers and 3,900 engineer (sapper) troops and using the existing ISR
civilian administrative and operating staff, the British Army had brought the
railway in the last five months of 1942 to a daily average for all cargoes of
some 1,500 tons. To do so they had doubled the trackage in the yards at
Andimeshk, Ahwaz, and Tehran, and had constructed over one hundred miles of
new line. They doubled the area of the erecting shops at Tehran and put up new
sheds, storehouses, workshops, and offices in various localities, as well as
new wire installations for telephone and telegraph up and down the line. They
doubled rolling stock, including motive power. Their achievement was not to be
underrated; but it fell far short of the 6,000-ton target now set by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff.33

General Connolly soon found that the inability of the railway to take away
landed cargoes from the ports was the key problem to be solved in the new
transport task facing him. The prospect was hardly pleasing. He wrote in
December:

My biggest mistake in estimating the situation before leaving Washington was
in thinking that the ports were the bottleneck. I find that at present the
rate of removing cargo from shipside determines the rate of unloading ships.
There is no storage at the docks. There are not sufficient trucks and railroad
rolling stock available, and what they do have they do not operate
efficiently. If I had known the above before leaving Washington, I would have
arranged my priorities of men and equipment differently.34

As told in Chapter X, rail operating units which had received top priority for
overseas shipment in early SOS planning shared equal priorities with port and
trucking troops in the revised arrangements.
[348]

Next after troop shipments came port unloading equipment, with diesels in
third place. The transition from British to American operation of the railway
was therefore prolonged over several months during which the American railway
troops were arriving, learning their jobs, and gradually taking over the line.
To command them General Connolly had selected Colonel Yount who had come to
the area in 1941 as a transportation expert with General Wheeler's Iranian
Mission and had then gone with Wheeler to India. Recalled from India, Yount
reached Basra on 5 October 1942, where, with a small forward echelon which
arrived later from the United States, he established a temporary railway
headquarters. In December, with its headquarters now moved to Ahwaz, the
Military Railway Service was established as one of the operating services of
the American command.35

A survey tour of the line conducted by Colonel Yount and conferences with
Iranian, Soviet, and British officials laid the groundwork for the gradual
process of take-over. This took place as fast as trained troops became
available. The first outfit to arrive was the 711 th Engineer Railway
Operating Battalion. Unlike other units which were sponsored by American
railways and later incorporated into the MRS, the 711th was all Army.
Activated in June 1941, it was ready for work when it reached Khorramshahr in
December 1942. Starting on 1 January 1943 by taking over from the British
operation of the line from that port to Ahwaz, by the 16th it was running the
trains from Dorud to both Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur.36
To provide headquarters staff personnel for administration of the MRS, the
702d Railway Grand Division arrived in January. Recently activated in October
1942, this group was sponsored by the Union Pacific Railroad and was largely
staffed by ex-civilian railroaders with a minimum of military training and
indoctrination. On 9 February, with his headquarters moved from Ahwaz to
Tehran, Colonel Yount formally assumed command as director and general manager
of MRS and of the 702d Railway Grand Division. An organization chart for March
shows a staff division of functions, into sections for Administration,
Transportation, Water, Equipment, Engineering, and Supply, with operating
functions centralized in two railway divisions-the
[349]

Northern, extending from Tehran to Dorud; and the Southern, from there to the
ports. The operating battalions derived their authority directly from the
director. Among the more important accomplishments of this headquarters group,
during the period of joint BritishAmerican operations, was the taking over by
its Equipment Section in February of responsibility for all railway rolling
stock and equipment. The Transportation Section, as a preliminary to the
assumption of full American operating responsibilities, found it necessary to
prepare a book of rules-the railroad man's bible-which would establish uniform
procedures based upon explicit instructions. The ISR possessed no automatic
signals, no interlocking or multiple tracks, and few grade crossings. Existing
ISR rules had to be co-ordinated with such American methods as could be
modified to local conditions. After protracted discussion with Soviet and
Iranian railway people, a standard book of rules was promulgated by common
consent on 1 April.

Meanwhile other operating units were arriving from the United States. In
January the 730th Engineer Railway Operating Battalion, sponsored by the
Pennsylvania Railroad, joined the 7 11th, which was already in charge of the
Southern Division. By the end of March, the 730th was ready to operate the
Northern Division. A few days previously, the 754th Railway Shop Battalion,
just arrived, took over the ISR's principal locomotive and car repair shops at
Tehran.

These four organizations, the administrative unit, two operating battalions,
and the shop battalion, totaled 3,067 officers and men, a number slightly
greater than the strength allotted to the American railway service by the
first estimates under the SOS Plan. Revised Tables of Organization provided
for an additional shop battalion to handle the American diesel engines which
were to take over the heaviest work from the steam locomotives.37 Accordingly,
the 762d Railway Diesel Shop Battalion added 632 officers and men to available
manpower upon its arrival in March. During April and the first week of May it
took over the shops at Ahwaz, consisting of back shop, the freight car
assembly shops, and the powerhouse.

By that time the MRS was already running, the railway from Tehran to the Gulf.
As of 1 April 1943 "responsibility for control of operations and maintenance
of the Iranian State Railway between Tehran and Persian Gulf Ports formerly
exercised by the Transportation Directorate (Persia) of PAI Force" devolved
upon the MRS. On 1 May, when the Anglo-American agreement for control of
movements came into
[350]

effect, railway movements, including allocation, scheduling of trains, and
distribution of rolling stock passed also to the Americans.38

At the beginning of May there were about 3,700 officers and men of the MRS
working on the railroad. Their numbers and the types of units assigned had
been determined at the War Department. The resulting Tables of Organization,
compiled far from the scene of activity, were not entirely adapted to field
conditions. In War Department theory an Qperating battalion was to have
jurisdiction over a stretch of 60 to 120 miles of single-track railway,
including one terminal. A railway grand division would direct two operating
battalions and one shop battalion, or a maximum of 240 miles of single-track
line and two terminals. In actual practice the 702d Railway Grand Division was
supervising two operating. battalions and two shop battalions, spread over 677
miles, as well as eight terminals; the 711th Railway Operating Battalion
operated 388 miles, and the 730th, 289 miles. An attack upon the problem of
thinly spread manpower was made when on 1 May the MRS activated the 1st
Provisional Railway Operating Battalion, later designated the 791st Railway
Operating Battalion. Men for the new outfit were drawn from those battalions
already in the area plus personnel from other units in the command with prewar
railroad experience. The new unit was assigned the 221-mile stretch of
mountainous country between Andimeshk and Sultanabad. Since this rearrangement
left the 711th with 258 miles and the 730th with 198, the theoretical limit of
120 miles was still far from attained. At the same time the two railway
divisions were divided into three: the Northern, from Tehran to Sulfanabad;
the Central, from Sultanabad to Andimeshk; and the Southern, from there to the
ports.

The conclusion of these arrangements in May 1943 gave the MRS organization a
form which remained essentially unaltered throughout its existence. This
structural stability was important to the success of the railway task. MRS
strength rose slightly after this date, but at its peak of about 4,000 it was
almost identical with the maximum strength of the British military railroaders
who preceded it.

One administrative change did occur, but this was largely a matter of
redesignation to make practice conform to theory. The 702d Railway Grand
Division, the administrative dynamo which powered the organization of MRS, was
intended by the War Department to be comparable to a civilian railway regional
headquarters; but it found itself actually serving as a military railway
service headquarters to which
[351]

grand divisions were intended by the Tables of Organization to be subordinate.
Although the MRS had been designated by PGSC as a military railway service, it
was not so recognized by the War Department, whose Military Railway Service,
up to November 1942 an organization within the Corps of Engineers, was that
month transferred to the new Transportation Corps and assigned the duty of
operating and maintaining all military railways in theaters of operation.39
By the summer of 1943 the headquarters staff of about one hundred, including
forty-three officers, was hard put to it to supervise the activities of 4,000
men in five battalions, and of approximately 15,000 ISR native employees. The
Tables of Organization made up at Washington did not recognize the
comprehensive functions of the staff under actual conditions. They provided,
for example, eighteen stationmasters with the rank of captain, but these were
not needed because ISR employees filled those positions. On the other hand
.the T/O made no provision for specialists in labor relations and left heavily
undermanned the administrative control of supply and accounting. In the latter
field, particularly, it was necessary to keep accurate financial records
against the day of final reckoning with the British and Iranians. Accordingly,
on 20 July Colonel Yount requested that the War Department authorize
establishment of an approved Headquarters, MRS, to replace the 702d Railway
Grand Division. General Connolly, in forwarding his recommendation, asked also
for officers to fill important functional gaps. After a delay of many months,
during which time the MRS reached the first of its two great peaks in tonnage
performance, approval came through from Washington, and on 10 April 1944
Headquarters, 3d MRS, PGC, was activated.40

Colonel Yount remained only a few weeks longer, for in May he was ordered to
the CBI theater to face fresh railway problems. His long period of service had
seen not only establishment of a pattern of organizational structure and
procedure which withstood time and vicissitude but also the achievement,
through increasing efficiency, of tonnages to which, to put it mildly, the ISR
was not previously
[352]

accustomed. He was succeeded as director by Col. Frank S. Besson, Jr., who
served until May 1945 when as a brigadier general he left Iran for a new
assignment. Under Colonel Besson the MRS met the test of the peak loads of the
latter part of 1944. Besson's two successors, Col. Aubrey M. Bruce and Lt.
Col. L. D. Curtis, carried on to the end of operations.

MRS organization charts show, in the latter period, little change from the
beginnings. In November 1943 the headquarters staff had five instead of six
sections, that for Water being eliminated, and the Supply Section being
redesignated Stores and Purchase. Five instead of four operating battalions
came under the director's command. The chart for October 1944 shows no change
from the preceding year. That for March 1945 indicates a distinction between
staff functions, still administered through five sections, now called
Administration, Operations, Transportation, Equipment, and Stores, and line
functions. The last, with line of command extending back to the director's
office, consisted of the running of trains-functioning through the Northern,
Central, and Southern Divisions-operation of the six railroad camps scattered
along the line, and maintenance operations at the shops at Tehran and Ahwaz.
Men at Work

When General Connolly observed in December 1942 that moving cargo inland was
at that time a tougher problem than unloading ships, he was indicating that
until port and rail capacities could be brought into balance the logistic
pipeline would tend to choke up altogether or feed its transit tonnage
spasmodically. Rail and port performance, though they must be recorded as
distinct enterprises, are nevertheless to be considered as intimately
affecting one another. In evaluating the ups and downs of tonnages hauled by
the ISR it is obvious that maximum rail haulage was possible only when maximum
cargoes were available at the ports. Table 3 and Charts 8, 9, and 10 help to
tell the rail story. When the statistical record shows rising ship discharge
accompanied by rising rail tonnage, it reveals ability of the railroad to keep
pace with demand. On the other hand, low rail tonnages may indicate either
inability of the railroad to carry cargoes away from the ports, or, as was the
more usual case after the apprentice period, diminution of incoming cargoes.
Although the entire transport operation was affected by administrative and
policy controls at the highest levels, their primary point of contact at the
operating level was at the ports. Here was the first test of co-ordinating
various functions which touched so closely that,
[353]

without clear-cut definition of what belonged to ports operation and what to
rail, confusion was inevitable. The two services, Ports and MRS, took over
their new responsibilities in alternating steps. On 1 January 1943 MRS began
to operate trains out of Khorramshahr. On the seventh, port operation of
Khorramshahr by Americans began, although British units remained to help. By
18 January MRS was running all the trains from Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur
to Dorud; and in mid-February American units assumed interim operation of the
port of Bandar Shahpur, with continuing British help. On 1 April both ports
and railroad commenced all-American operation, and on 1 May began effective
American control of movements in the British zone. But even before the first
American assumption of operating responsibilities, Colonel Booth for Ports and
Colonel Yount for MRS had, in December 1942, agreed on a division of labor at
dockside, where their jurisdictions met and were likely to become
operationally entangled. The ports organization would control the rail yards
including car loading, and storage operations, while MRS would control
switching engines, and would maintain technical supervision over rolling stock
in the rail yards.41

Car switching at the ports was a crucial part of the process of making up
trains and speeding removal of landed cargoes inland. This was particularly so
at Bandar Shahpur, where the only means of inland clearance from the island
was by rail. By February 1943 nearly 20 percent of the total available
strength of the 711th Railway Operating Battalion were switching cars at the
two ports. Charts 9 and 10 show that at both ports, but especially at
Khorramshahr, ship discharge outran rail clearance during the early months of
1943. To obtain closer co-ordination of rail and port functions Booth and
Yount agreed in May to put all railway terminal operations at Khorramshahr
under port operating command. This settlement left the railway free for its
single task of running trains and placed all strictly port functions under
port control. By simplifying the MRS task, it contributed in no small measure
to the stability of that organization's functional pattern and soon bore fruit
in rising efficiency.

The Americans were active in many other ways during those early months of
1943. Locomotives here assigned to districts according to power requirements;
American and Iranian personnel made studies of track construction, sidings,
tunnels, and bridges, and improved trackage at Ahwaz and Khorramshahr to
expedite car handling. Distribution of air-brake equipment and hand brakes in
trains was standardized. Studies were begun for improvement of water
facilities, for
[354]

the installation of diesel fuel oil storage tanks, and for storing "dead"
engines at Tehran. New engine sheds at Ahwaz were projected. Damage to the
communications system by thieves, electrical and snow storms, and the March
floods was inspected and repairs begun. All along the line from January
through March there was intense activity as the date neared for complete
American take-over. American soldiers observed British and Iranian operations
to familiarize themselves with procedure, the nature of available equipment,
and the railway line itself. American mechanics studied at the British shops
in Tehran the peculiarities of the locomotives they were to inherit. Tests
were made of air sanders on British locomotives, and of hand brakes on
American flatcars and tank cars. As fast as they arrived the new diesels were
erected. The first diesel-hauled train moved from Ahwaz to Andimeshk in March.
In another month all freight trains and mixed trains from ports to Andimeshk
were powered by these 126-ton, 1,000-horsepower engines.

The heavy March rains that flooded the newly built road out of Khorramshahr
also caused a serious traffic delay on the railroad. Several thousand feet of
track and one bridge were washed out on the Khorramshahr-Ahwaz line,
suspending train movements for ten days except for one train each way on
alternate days. Track gangs worked in driving rain to prevent spreading of the
damage. Though Soviet haulage fell off in March as a result of the floods and
of several accidents, the total of all cargoes showed a slight increase over
February.42

In spite of such troubles, the interim period of joint Anglo-American
operations achieved in March two encouraging records. On the third the 711th
Battalion moved 6,402 long tons up to Andimeshk in. seven trains, eclipsing
any previous single day's record in ISR history. Thus, even before the
Americans came into full control of operations, it was demonstrated that the
ISR could be made to meet and to exceed the new target set for it by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff. On 29 March a speed record was set when a special
diesel-powered passenger train bearing Her Majesty Taj-ol-Moluk, the Queen
Mother of Iran, covered the eighty-seven miles between Ahwaz and Andimeshk in
two hours and thirty-eight minutes.

The setting of targets was a matter of concern to all operating authorities.
One American consideration during the negotiations which led to American
assumption of movements control was the feeling that if targets could be more
accurately estimated than hitherto there would be less chance of disappointing
the Russians. It was desirable
[355]

to reduce complaints by reducing the errors of optimism. The policies and
methods by which tonnage targets for the railway were established were
determined during the first half of 1943. Each monthly target for MRS was set
after the capacity of the railroad had been determined, the potential capacity
being based on the number of cars and locomotives available in serviceable
condition. A preliminary monthly target meeting was then held by American and
British representatives to estimate the amount of essential internal
tonnage-American and British military freight and Iranian civil freight-which
could be moved in the following month. The internal tonnage thus determined
was then deducted from the potential capacity, itself a species of over-all
target. The difference was the Russian-aid target or estimated cargo tonnage
for delivery to the Russians at Tehran.

Although Table 5 shows rising Russian-aid haulage for each of the months of
April through July 1943, the target was not always reached. Tonnage for April,
for example, fell short by 10 percent, but nevertheless represented the most
the Russians had got in any one month up to that time. August, when tonnages
fell off sharply, was the last month during the period of MRS operations in
Iran in which performance fell below the target level. And thereby hangs a
tale in which the Russians figure prominently.43

The division of labor in May 1943 between .the Ports Service and MRS made for
closer co-ordination of loading at the ports. The trouble lay not only in some
confusion resulting from divided responsibility for what was determined to be
a strictly port function but also in a problem much more difficult to control,
namely, the availability of cars for loading. Here the necessity existed for
more efficient use of cars within MRS; but the availability of cars was even
more importantly related to Soviet operations north of Tehran. If the Soviet
railway organization could not take away loads as fast as they were delivered,
or if they did not return empty cars from their zone to the MRS with
sufficient regularity, congestion was bound to occur in the south. It was
clear from the first that MRS had to provide adequate numbers of cars at the
ports. To that end, beginning in March 1943, adjustments were made to
facilitate car turnaround from the Soviet zone. Delays north of Tehran arose
in the first instance from heavy rains and snowstorms which cut off train
movements for a day or two at a time. At a meeting of Soviet and American
representatives in March the Americans agreed to assign cars temporarily to
the Russians
[356]

to haul track ballasting material to repair and strengthen damaged portions of
their line. The Americans also agreed to furnish locomotives when needed to
assist the Russians' train movement. In all, seventy-six American locomotives
were so lent during 1943. It was further agreed that as fast as the MRS could
repair worn-out or damaged locomotives belonging to the ISR they would be
delivered for use by the Russians. Eventually MRS repaired nearly all
locomotives and cars used by MRS and the Russians.44

The provision of emergency aid to the Soviet railroaders was the first task of
the March meeting; but agreement as to car allocations up and down the ISR
from Caspian to Gulf was equally important if traffic was to move smoothly.
The Americans proposed allocations for different sectors, for different types
of cars-such as ballast and service cars and oil tankers-and for different
kinds of cargoes. But the Russians would not commit themselves. They expressed
general satisfaction with the assignments proposed but needed time for
analysis. They questioned the necessity for the allotment of cars provided
between the ports and Tehran to meet Iranian civilian, and British and
American military, needs, suggesting that these be reduced in favor of
Russianaid traffic. And they blandly pointed out the fact that no formal
operating agreement existed. The Anglo-American discussions as to authority
were still going on and feelers were being actively put out in the direction
of both bilateral agreements and a general four-power agreement. Under the
circumstances the Russians would not recognize American authority to allocate
cars, and they were unimpressed by the Americans' suggestion that, since the
only business in hand was to speed aid-to-Russia traffic, it was best to make
all necessary arrangements for operating whether or not the formal paper
agreements had yet been concluded.

The next month, after the movements agreement with the British was signed, the
Americans tried again. At a meeting in Colonel Yount's office on 19 April
further car allocation proposals were made to the Russians, who countered with
a request for increasing the target for tonnages to be carried north of
Andimeshk. The Americans replied that the present target was based upon a
22-day car turnaround between the ports and destinations in the Soviet zone
and that, since the turnaround
[357]

was currently greater than that, the target figure would have to stand.
Although Russian-aid freight hauled by the Americans increased steadily from
April through July, it was necessary to bolster the Soviet sector of the ISR
by constant loans of locomotives and air-braked cars, essential for train
operation in the mountainous country north of Tehran. MRS, by careful
planning, gradually raised the percentage of air-braked cars available for
Soviet-operated trains from fifteen to forty. To reduce the job of
reclassification in the Tehran yards otherwise needed to provide these
air-braked cars, MRS began to make "blocked" trains at Andimeshk composed of
cars with a common through destination.

Even with such help, the Soviet trainmen continued to falter in the race to
carry away from Tehran what the MRS brought to them. In July 1943 tank cars
for high-octane gasoline were making a 30-day turnaround between Khorramshahr
and Bandar Shah on the Caspian, and this was twice as long as American
calculations provided for. During July and August such a congestion of traffic
occurred in the Soviet zone between Tehran and Bandar Shah as to choke the
yards at Tehran with loaded cars waiting to go on and to leave the Gulf ports
almost void of empty cars for loading at shipside. The pipeline, clogged at
its northern end, was unable to take in cargo at the south, and an embargo
resulted. From 8 to 13 August the Americans at the Gulf ports stopped loading
cars for Bandar Shah to give the Russians time to catch up. Russian haulage
fell off from July to August by 12,000 long tons.

The summer crisis forced General Connolly to inform General Korolyev, Chief of
the Soviet Transportation Department in Iran, that it might be necessary to go
even further, and to stop all shipments into Iran if the Russians could not
tighten their operations procedures enough to put Soviet and MRS haulage into
balance. As a result the Russians promised to make improvements, and kept
their promises; but at the end of the year Tehran saw a new transportation
chief for the Russians, Maj. Gen. Ivan V. Kargin.

Except for a hesitation in November, Russian-aid tonnages carried by MRS to
Tehran rose steadily for the rest of 1943; but not without periods of serious
congestion when it was necessary to store loads at stations south of Tehran
because of Soviet inability to accept anything more at the capital. The
vigorous efforts of MRS management gradually improved car turnaround. A
backlog of 906 cars of USSRbound cargo at Andimeshk early in September was
reduced in three weeks to 281 loads by shifting extra enlisted men of the 762d
Battalion to detached service at the Andimeshk yards to speed the work. Even
more spectacular improvement was achieved in the matter of the tank
[358]

cars whose Gulf to Caspian turnaround in July had been thirty days. By
increasing the loading facilities at the Gulf end and the unloading facilities
at the Caspian, by improving train schedules, by blocking such cars into
special trains rather than mixing them with other types of car, by giving
priority to all Soviet-destined gasoline, and by time saving resulting from
improved communications, the average tank car turnaround fell in 1944 to ten
days and in 1945 to eight.

The banner year, the year in which the ingenuity and resourcefulness of MRS
management and the hard work of its men paid off in tons, was 1944. That is
not to say that 1944 was all plain sailing. Persistent attack on the problem
of car turnaround continued, the outstanding innovation being the blocking of
trains at the ports instead of at Andimeshk, thus reducing switching time at
Ahwaz and Andimeshk and causing a speed-up in the total running time of given
cargoes.

Three accidents, two on the Soviet sector of the ISR, interrupted the flow of
traffic but failed to dent the statistical record. In February trains were
backed up for a time while track, torn up by an accident, was repaired; and in
May a washout on the line east of Tehran stopped operations for two days. In
the second case, MRS rushed forty-two men to the scene and repaired the
damage, and the Russians who, under the circumstances, offered no objections
to the penetration of their zone by the Americans, came through with official
commendations. On the American part of the line the summer saw the destruction
by fire in the mountains southwest of Sultanabad of a train of twenty-five
cars, most of them carrying high-octane gasoline to the Russians.45
On 28 July the delivery of the one-and-a-half millionth ton to the Russians
called for a celebration. A 48-car train which stopped for flourishes at all
the main stations along the northbound route was the center of culminating
ceremonies at Tehran on that date. Fanfare, speeches, and a souvenir pamphlet
took their due places in history and, as the American soldier railroaders
handed over the trainload of tanks and war materiel to their Soviet opposites,
one of them gave a cigarette to the burly Russian girl who was fireman on the
northbound engine. Cameras clicked. There were cheers.46 The American command
eventually overcame the objections of the British and Soviet commands to
public announcement of the extent of American aid-to-Russia
[359]

operations in the Corridor. In the United States the public in time came to
know something of the American achievement.

While internal traffic maintained a fairly steady level through 1944,
Russian-aid tonnages fluctuated with the rates of ship discharge. The charts
show that Khorramshahr experienced two sharp recessions in cargo arrivals,
Bandar Shahpur three, while both ports were equally affected by the sudden and
precipitate upsurge in midsummer. At Khorramshahr the MRS kept ahead of the
game in handling Sovietbound tonnages except for the peak month of landings,
July; that month produced the railroad's all-time top for total cargoes, but
it did not achieve its highest Russian-aid haulage until September. Similarly,
at Bandar Shahpur there was only the briefest period at year's end when MRS
fell temporarily behind landings. The year proved that MRS could absorb
everything that was thrown at it and come back for more.

Problems and Solutions

Many of the most pressing problems which confronted the MRS arose from
activities not directly connected with the running of trains. Upon their
solution the success of operations hung no less than upon such matters as car
allocations. There were questions of security and safety, of public relations
and personnel administration. There were maintenance and repair and the
development of adequate communications facilities; and there were matters of
procedure and practice in the fields of purchasing, procurement, and
accounting.

Security and Safety

The 702d Railway Grand Division, which was later merged into the 3d MRS
headquarters, found itself plunged into many unfamiliar and unexpected
responsibilities. Among these was security of train operations against
sabotage, banditry, and pilferage. The SOS Plan provided only two military
police battalions for the American command on the presumption that security
was a British obligation. When it became clear that railroad security required
supplementary American surveillance, MRS established at its headquarters in
February 1943 a Security Section to work under the American provost marshal's
office and in collaboration with British and Soviet field security forces in
Iran.47

Scattered up and down the line these attempted to curtail pilferage. Small
tools, sugar, tires, arms, and ammunition were particularly
[360]

vulnerable to theft. Copper wire and brass were welcomed on the black market,
as were all manner of American post exchange supplies and lend-lease materials
intended for Russia. Some Americans trafficked in items that found their way
into the black market and when possible they were apprehended and
court-martialed.48

they spite of the posting of guards along the railway, by the end of 1943
pilferage of cargo had reached alarming proportions and monthly conferences
were held to discuss solutions for the problem. As a result, in January 1944
Russian guards were placed on trains from Andimeshk to Tehran. Only those
persons, exclusive of American and Iranian crews, possessing temporary passes
were permitted by Russian guards to ride freight trains. Furthermore,
self-locking American car seals were installed on cars to minimize car
pilferage.

To curtail pilferage among Iranian laborers in the shops and camps and to
prevent entry of natives who were not ISR or MRS employees, systems of button
and card identification were instituted. Too many of the natives employed by
the railway could not resist the temptation to purloin whatever could be
concealed beneath their garments and it became necessary to search their
persons before permitting their exit from their posts. Natives found guilty of
thefts were turned over to the Iranian Gendarmerie for prosecution.
As new measures to alleviate a current situation became effective, fresh
problems arose. The overlapping of British arid American responsibilities had
been handled for a year on a day-to-day basis of mutual convenience. Some
Americans felt some British lacking in a proper realization of the importance
of policing the line adequately; but in this respect American complaints of
British indifference or worse diminished as American responsibilities and
experience in the field increased. The American command, in a circular
published in February 1944, recognized the working responsibility of MRS for
protection of command supplies in transit.49

Two months later, looting of northbound trains was resumed on the line south
of Andimeshk. Indian guard detachments were reinforced and, as the raiding
parties suffered numerous fatalities, pilferage declined once more. Particular
emphasis was placed on guarding com-
[361]

mand cargo and in April, for the first time in MRS operation, there was a
report of no pilferage of that class of cargo along the railway. Three months
later, at a joint conference held on 7 August 1944, the Russians were able to
report that pilferage was currently at the lowest point since supplies started
moving over the ISR to Russia. Nevertheless, during August 1944 it was
reported that the Desert and Mountain Districts recovered $23,317.16 worth of
pilfered command and Russian-aid goods.50

Security measures in Iran extended beyond precautions against pilferage and
black market activities. Nazi interest in Iran for purposes of securing access
to Iran's oil fields and India was undeniable. A proGerman attitude was
prevalent in many quarters and there was an undercurrent of resentment toward
Allied intrusion in Iran. The arrest because of active Axis sympathy, in
August 1943, of fifty ISR employees attested to these facts. Those arrested
included chiefs of many ISR departments. On the Sultanabad division of the ISR
so thorough a purge was made that no one in authority remained to administer
the division which employed 3,000 men. Papers found in the possession of many
of the accused proved that they were members of an Axis spy ring which had
definite plans for sabotaging the ISR. Their arrests coincided with that of
the chief of German intelligence in Iran, Franz Mayer, whose main interest was
in disrupting Allied aid to Russia by brigandage directed against the railroad
and highway routes.51

A safety program was established concurrently with the security program, but
it suffered an indifferent existence until the MRS had operated for many
months in Iran. One of the earliest safety measures-the issuance of a book of
rules-was prompted by an accident which occurred at the outset of MRS
operations. The trains which moved the men of the 711th Battalion to their
various posts were manned by enlisted members of that battalion, in company
with Iranian crews and under British control. On 24 December 1942 a group of
U.S. Army men left Khorramshahr for Andimeshk. The derailment of a boxcar in
Khorramshahr yard delayed the train's scheduled departure that evening and the
train actually left Khorramshahr shortly after midnight. Early Christmas
morning, when the passengers were asleep, the train crashed head on into a
southbound freight train. Both trains were running without lights. One soldier
was killed and fifteen were injured and, though none of the crew was held
[362]

responsible for this first wreck, preventive measures were immediately taken.52
Following the accident regulations were tightened. One American conductor and,
when possible, one American engineer were to be on each train, the latter to
supervise the work of the Iranian engineer. The conductor was to be in charge
of the train, supervise the work of the Iranian crew, and assume
responsibility for the safe movement of the train. Before departure from each
station the conductor was to notify the American dispatcher at the next
station and also check with the Iranian conductor to make certain of
clearance.

An intensive study was made of the operating conditions in the Tehran yards
where delivery was made to the Russians of cargo destined for the Soviet
front. Standard procedure provided that the "consist" of each train leaving
Andimeshk be teletyped to Tehran. This was a kind of manifest which showed the
number of each car in the train, its contents, and its destination. The
yardmaster in Tehran, informed in advance of the arrival of each train,
assigned a track. On the train's arrival in the yards each car was inspected
for mechanical defects and the condition of its seals, proper reports were
rendered, and any defective cars were segregated for repair. Thereafter the
train was split up; cars destined for Bandar Shah were placed on one track,
those for Shahrud on another, and those for Mianeh on still another. Cars
containing civil Iranian freight billed to Tehran also were placed on a
different track, to be moved later to proper destination-the customs yard, the
Tehran Silo, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the Goods Shed, or the Russian
Dump. After trains were separated for movement west or east of Tehran, all
cars were again checked as on arrival, especially those loaded with explosives
or inflammables. All air brakes were rechecked. The increase in the number of
cars equipped with air brakes from 12.5 percent to 70 percent in two years of
American operation was an important factor in the safety record established on
the ISR, as was the rigid mechanical inspection of each train at each
terminal.53

In 1944 a comprehensive safety program was inaugurated; posters were produced
monthly for distribution at all installations under MRS jurisdiction and
safety was made part of the training program. Awards in the form of
certificates were given those whose records showed that, for six or twelve
months, they had observed safety rules.54 During the winter of 1944-45 train
schedules were revised to restrict operations to
[363]

daylight hours. It was hoped in this way to decrease hazards along the tunnel
sector between Andimeshk and Dorud.

Public Relations

Americans have learned slowly and with bewilderment to defend themselves
against charges flung at them by those whom they have attempted to help. It
always proves puzzling to learn how readily the beneficiary perceives in a
disinterested action some Machiavellian design. Iran was no exception, and
those elements in the community that chose to blame their country's war-born
difficulties upon the Americans easily fitted the railway into their patterns.
The ISR was mercilessly attacked in Tehran newspapers for losses of shipments
and alleged graft, and two successive ministers of roads were reported to
believe conditions as bad as some papers alleged. The Americans, as mentors of
the ISR, came in for blame. Students of American soldier-instructors in
English classes-instituted by the Labor Section of MRS and attended by Iranian
Army officers, businessmen, and employees of the railroad and of other
government agencies-when asked their opinions of the ISR seldom spoke well of
it. Most of them had no idea what the ISR was doing. And perhaps the most
unfortunate circumstance of all was that no one in Iran seemed aware that,
under American operation, the railroad in 1944 was transporting twice as much
Iranian civilian tonnage as had been hauled before 1943. There was even a
general expectation that the Allies would pay Iran heavy damages for
disrupting its internal economy by appropriating the ISR for the purposes of
the war. After the war, "Prince" Mozaffer Firouz, when he was briefly serving
as Iranian Ambassador at Moscow, claimed, in a bold sally into statistics,
that half a billion dollars' worth of unspecified damage had been done to the
ISR during the war.55

Elements in the Iranian Government itself, unhappy over the cooperation given
by Hossain Nafisi, civilian director-general, sought his dismissal. After
obtaining the prior approval of the British and Soviet Embassies, General
Connolly authorized the director of the MRS on 18 October 1944 to issue a
memorandum which stated that neither the American nor the Soviet
transportation authorities recognized any change in Nafisi's status, and this
stand was vigorously backed three days later by the commander of PAI Force.56
[364]

Though the immediate issue of administrative procedure and authority was thus
settled, by the end of 1944 the Iranian press had grown so voluble against
American management that on Colonel Besson's initiative special efforts were
launched to inform the public. Press tours of line and installations had been
held from 1943 on. One was arranged in December 1944, followed in May 1945 by
another arranged for the Shah, the (queen, members of the Majlis, and other
government officials. On this latter occasion the presentation by the Shah to
Mr. Nafisi of the Iranian Medal of Merit marked the distance traveled toward
public enlightenment.57

Personnel Administration

MRS operated through its own military personnel and the existing staff of the
ISR, a total force averaging some 19,000 persons. The standardization implicit
in Tables of Organization posed numerous problems. Some positions these
established were found unnecessary, as in the case of the stationmasters
already cited. One instance of snafu occurred in which several Pullman porters
arrived to join a railway operating battalion.

Hurried recruitment and training of professional railroaders showed up
significant differences between a good railroad man and a good military
railroad man. An Army officer is responsible for his men, day and night, and
under all circumstances. Officers commissioned directly from successful
professional experience in railroad operation brought with them no such
special competence. The consequent assignment of some men to positions for
which they were not qualified, and the lack of men for specific needs led, for
a while, to acute dissatisfaction throughout the organization. In time, as men
were trained and commissioned in the field, and as rotation and new assignment
altered conditions, the situation was improved.58

The problems which went along with MRS dependence upon Iranian labor were
varied. The war had upset the Iranian economy and a crop failure had induced
widespread hunger. Wages had not kept pace with prices, which had skyrocketed
800 percent in three years. Bread riots were rife in Tehran. Furthermore,
bound by its instructions to comply with Iranian laws and regulations, the MRS
inherited conditions under which the vague and inadequately codified
regulations of the ISR had long encouraged administrative looseness. The MRS
[365]

Labor Section undertook to introduce a western consistency not altogether
welcome to the eastern mind.59

The first serious labor problem was presented in March 1943 by the floods
which damaged some nine miles of line on the desert below Ahwaz. Not a single
laborer could be procured to work on the washedout section because of the
competition for Iranian labor among various American Army services in the area
and because at the time the ISR could employ none to work in that locality.
The Army was then extending to native labor, in addition to regular wages, a
daily allowance of two rials with which to purchase a ration of tea, sugar,
and flour. The MRS determined to extend the same privilege to ISR employees
south of Ahwaz, and when a large group of natives had been convinced of the
availability of food in that section a trainload of them was dispatched to the
scene. Later, railroad labor was accorded the same ration as skilled labor in
Ahwaz, and an average of 4,500 employees per month received that ration.
There were early labor troubles at Tehran. In April 1943 native train and
engine crews began absenting themselves from duty because food was too hard to
get on the lines out of Tehran. Since regular train service had to be
maintained to move the freight destined for Russia, conferences were held with
the American adviser to the Iranian Ministry of Foods.60 A contract resulted
whereby the ISR would distribute government-rationed bread to its employees in
Tehran. A rationing system was developed, ration cards were distributed, two
Army trucks were secured for transportation, and five stores were opened in
the Tehran yards on 12 April 1943, when 7,000 of the flat, native loaves of
bread were sold. Within a few weeks, sales on peak days reached 12,500 loaves.
The Americans somehow contrived to fulfill their promise of daily bread sales;
when the supply threatened to be exhausted, the bakery was pressed to speed
its production, and distribution continued. It became necessary to provide
Americans to maintain order at the stores to ensure first-come, first-served
treatment. The Labor Section was proud that no employee who applied was denied
bread. Within the ISR, the Food Department, which was charged with the
responsibility of buying food for resale to native employees, required
westernization. In January 1943, for instance, dried beans mixed with pebbles
were being sold to the natives. Wheat contained so much foreign matter that
its consumers suffered severe headaches and digestive ills. The MRS took
control, placed an American officer in charge,
[366]

and improved the situation. By June 1943 monthly sales of all food had reached
500 tons.

In April 1943 there also occurred a wage crisis which was attributed to
inequities in government regulations and to indifference among ISR officials.
Approximately one third of the skilled and semiskilled roundhouse employees at
Sultanabad had quit in one month. The MRS studied the situation and found that
wages of some employees with seniority were extremely low and that new
employees were being hired to do the same work for more pay. There were no
accurate lists of employees and no personnel data. Falsification and guesses
existed in the ISR lists. The names of Armenians and Turks were omitted;
friends were tabulated at higher wages than those to which their duties
entitled them. Eventually, personnel lists were revised and reclassification
and wage adjustments accomplished, so that a measure of seniority and equity
was accomplished in the wage conditions of ISR personnel.

During the summer of 1943 it had become apparent that the ISR was effecting
discharges adverse to the interests of the MRS. Political in essence, this
situation entailed lengthy controversies with the ISR and with the Ministry of
Roads. The MRS finally developed a system of transferring to its payrolls any
employee whom the ISR elected to discharge but whom the MRS considered
necessary to keep.

In December 1943 strikes threatened the ISR and the success of MRS's mission.
There were various causes, one of which stemmed from the ISR's failure to make
the so-called "high cost of living allowance" authorized for all government
employees. Actually, a technicality which had required action by the Council
of Ministers was responsible for the ISR's failure. Agitators spread rumors to
the effect that ISR had refused to make the payment, and many of the
employees, easily inflamed against any form of real or imagined tyranny, were
quickly aroused. The MRS counteracted the threat by guaranteeing that the
bonus would be paid. The first monthly installment was made in December and
ISR labor was quieted. Other trouble developed because a few enginemen failed
to receive wage increases and because of irregularities in the distribution of
free uniforms. It was soon learned that ISR men were being formed into
organized unions. The Railway Workers' Union, however, professed to be opposed
to strikes, and various intercepted communications sent by it to its local
committees were found to demand that there be no union interference with the
movement of war goods to Russia. Occasional meetings were held between MRS
personnel and union leaders and a number of the union's recommendations were
acted upon. It was reported that very few unreasonable requests were
presented.
[367]

Twice in 1944 the strikes threatened in 1943 occurred. In March, government
employees at the Tehran Silo struck for higher wages and obtained a wage
increase for unloading laborers who were railway employees. In August 1944,
500 unloading natives in the Goods Shed in Tehran went on strike. The reason
was that ISR employees under Russian supervision had been granted a wage
increase of ten rials per day. Since labor working under Russian supervision
represented about 3 percent of all such labor employed in the Goods Shed, it
was finally determined that the daily wage would remain at thirty rials. An
increase in the wage for that class of employee would have resulted in
increases for 10,000 on the ISR payrolls, and elsewhere there was adequate
labor willing to work for 30 rials daily.

American supervision of the Iranian labor force on the railroad provided an
interesting experiment in the introduction of western ideas. The willingness
and adaptability of the ISR civilian administrative staff were important
factors in the, experiment's success. A minor illustration points to the small
revolution in ideas which accompanied the war effort on the ISR. Although in
the offices of the chief of police and chief of secretariat Moslem custom
still forbade approval of the employment of women, by January 1945, 150 women
were working in the offices of the ISR.

Maintenance and Repair

Maintenance of way and rolling stock, as well as continued operation on an
increasing tonnage scale, required as routine measures steady improvement to
physical plant. New trackage installed included passing sidings, freight and
sorting yards, and rail-to-truck transfer tracks at Andimeshk and Tehran.
Engine sheds were built at Ahwaz, warehouses at several points, and sandhouses
were spaced from Andimeshk north to provide adequate supplies of screened sand
in the mountains. Tanks for storage of water and others for diesel fuel oil
were placed where needed. Perhaps the strangest work of all was the virtually
new construction required through the mountains where the light rails, laid to
carry only the mild and infrequent little trainloads of prewar times, "crept"
under the weight of war tonnages. Reballasting and elaborate rail anchorage
solved this serious problem.61

Water facilities on the ISR became one of the first problems for the MRS. In
Iran, water comes from wells, springs, and streams, but there is little water
reserve because there is little moisture. There is a great diminution of water
supply in the hot autumn months, before the wet season replenishes it, and
consideration had to be given to the
[368]

need for uninterrupted water supply. At one point water was pumped twenty-five
miles to the place of consumption from a river which has been known to rise as
much as thirty feet in one night during the rainy season. Existing ISR water
facilities were improved by installation of additional pumps, settling basins,
and storage tanks. To utilize every possible agency by which to increase water
supply, the MRS in four places tapped the ancient Persian qanat system of
distributing water underground by gravity. The ISR then contracted with
village owners for the use of this water.62

It is easy to understand why diesel locomotives were assembled in Iran as
rapidly as they arrived. After two years of service, the diesels used only
twenty gallons of water per trip from the Gulf to Tehran. They did not have to
draw upon the various water stations along the line. Moreover, their slight
exhaust created none of the distress suffered by the men on steam trains in
the long unventilated tunnels. By 1 July 1943, 57 of these diesels had been
erected and put into service on the line. Ninety-one American mikado
locomotives, as well as 8 reconditioned Hong Kong engines, were in use. In
addition, there were the 240 locomotives already operating in March; 143
locomotives of the 2-8-0 class furnished by Great Britain, and 57 Ferrostaals
of the 2-8-0 and 2-10-0 classes and 40 steam locomotives of miscellaneous
types which belonged to the ISR. The coming of the diesels dramatized the face
lifting of the line, and the augmented numbers of locomotives contrasted with
the 110 steam engines, mostly unserviceable, which the British took over in
1941.63 Of nonpassenger cars, the British found 1,998, divided among 924
boxcars, 457 low-side gondolas, 87 freight cars, 295 tank cars, 170 ballast
cars and 65 rail cars. Of the total, far too many lacked brakes of any sort,
and such hand brakes as were in use were inadequate for heavy loads on steep
grades. In their first year the British imported 891 additional cars and 1,990
were shipped in from the United States, to bring the total to 4,779 freight
cars, still a number considered altogether insufficient to handle the
Russian-aid target. By 1 May 1943 there were 5,088 cars of all classes on the
line, most of them hand braked and all having screw couplings. As of midJune
1945, after 2,906 cars had been brought to Iran by the MRS, the total of
working cars was 7,994. Sixty-five percent of the new arrivals
[369]

were air braked, and, with the diesels, they bore the brunt of the heavy war
traffic.

One very important aspect of MRS operations was the business of the 762d and
754th Shop Battalions. Responsible for the repair of a great variety of
locomotives and cars of British, German, and American origin and, at the same
time, faced in early 1943 with a critical shortage of locomotive and car
parts, the shop battalions did a remarkable job. Many mechanical items were
not procurable in Iran and those which could be found were exorbitantly
costly. It became obvious, therefore, that parts would have to be manufactured
by .the men in order to repair equipment and keep it serviceable. Both foreign
and obsolete tools had to be used until American tools arrived.
Methods of tool and parts manufacture were crude. For instance, there was an
acute need for quantities of brake shoes. They could not be procured in Iran,
nor was the ISR, which before the war had -ordered them from the German
manufacturers of its equipment, equipped to manufacture its own. The 754th
Battalion established a foundry at the Tehran shops. Molds for the brake shoes
were fashioned in the hard earth, which was the floor of the foundry, and the
molten iron poured in. Although the process was primitive, production by
native workers under American soldier supervision was substantial. In the
month of August 1944, 2,450 brake shoes were manufactured. The total for two
years of operation was somewhere near 50,000.

No less useful, though of less heroic proportions, was the foundry's
contribution to the art of dentistry. The 19th Station Hospital at Tehran
needed castings for a great number of dentures for command personnel and the
754th was requested to furnish .them, which it did, all in the day's work.64
One of the first tasks of the 762d Battalion was the erection of diesels and
rail cars as they arrived in Persian Gulf ports. Tools to be used for this
purpose had to be devised from the scant material at hand and methods had to
be improvised, but the battalion carried out the demands made upon it. By the
end of 1943, 2,210 cars and the fifty-seven 1,000-horsepower diesel
locomotives previously mentioned had been assembled.65 A total of 1,076
freight cars had been equipped with heavy couplings and friction draft gear.
The month of December 1943 saw virtual completion of the programs for car
erection and installation of air brakes. During 1943, 854 cars were equipped
with
[370]

air brakes. Mikado-type locomotives were modified by installing improved
sanders with enlarged boxes. The slipping of locomotives on grades was thus
reduced to a minimum and more rapid turnaround resulted. The use of grease
rather than oil lubrication for rod bearings reduced the incidence of
overheated bearings and consequent engine deterioration. The increase in
demand made upon the shop battalions is best illustrated by a comparison of
the number of cars repaired during certain specific months. In June 1943, 144
cars were repaired; in December of the same year 2,704 cars were repaired; the
number increased to 6,985 cars repaired during the month of December 1944.
A further contribution of the shop battalions was their supervision and
training of ISR employees in modern methods of locomotive and car repair and
modification. The assembly line replaced the Iranian system of bunching
workers to repair a single locomotive or car. Schools were set up to teach
natives the reconditioning and salvaging of usable spare parts. They also
taught the repair, improvisation, and maintenance of machine-tool equipment.
There was some difficulty at first since those who made drawings for
modification had to work in millimeters, inches, kilograms, British and
American tons-and in four languages. The language difficulty was partly
overcome by publication of a booklet on locomotive parts printed in English,
French, Russian, and Persian. Copies of the booklet were distributed to all
points on the ISR. In its many schools for ISR employees, MRS was
conspicuously successful in developing large numbers of skilled workers.66
The dependence of the shop battalions upon an uncertain flow of supplies,
whether from the local market or from the United States, called for ingenuity
in improvising in frequent periods of dearth. In April 1943 the Stores Section
of the ISR was transferred to the jurisdiction of the MRS to cut down stealing
by substituting disciplined supervision. This was part of a general
arrangement with Millspaugh whereby MRS kept an eye on ISR finances. Americans
had previously been assigned to familiarize themselves with Iranian and
British stocks and a small British cadre was retained temporarily to advise.
The ISR system of classification of supplies was cumbersome and impractical;
their three types of supplies were subdivided into fifty or more. MRS
simplified the classification system and set up records which would indicate
what supplies were available.

Acute shortages existed in small tools, spare parts for locomotives, freight
car wheels, and axles. Arrivals of railroad supplies from the United States
between May and August 1943 alleviated the situation
[371]

to a considerable degree, but the shortage of freight car wheels and axles
created a serious problem again in June 1944. Shipments finally arrived in
July and August and these parts were installed immediately on cars which had
been held up for some time for lack of them. Shortages in specific items
continued to exist so that by February 1945, 6,266 items had been on
requisition for twelve months.67

Railway Communications

Communications facilities directly required in railway operations were
regarded by the American command as a part of its signals responsibilities.
Although the Americans had engaged in both construction and operation of
signals facilities on a small scale before 1943, British signal troops, for
lack of American, had operated, maintained, or, through their control of the
ISR, had supervised railway communications facilities even after the MRS took
over the line. In March 1943, after the arrival in the field of the 95th
Signal Battalion, the Signal Communication Service of the American command was
directed to operate and maintain such signals facilities as were required by
the MRS. From 31 May responsibility fell upon that service for wire circuits
and railway signals installations, whether Iranian, British, or American,
along the line from Tehran south to Khorramshahr, Tanuma, and Bandar Shahpur.
The service therefore organized a Railway Sector to parallel the regional
sectors already set up to cover administrative requirements within the command
districts. The Railway Sector handled not only MRS business, but also provided
a through service for administrative traffic common to the command
districts.68

The year 1943 saw the most substantial addition to railway signals facilities.
Wires in railway operational use in late 1942 had consisted of a galvanized
iron ground return circuit. This was reserved for ISR use, but British signal
units operated over it a net of teletype machines with printers at Tehran,
Dorud, and Andimeshk, and a physical relay at Dorud. The circuit provided both
a telegraph line and a block-toblock telephone service for train control.
There was also a copper dispatch circuit, under British control, reserved for
ISR operations. Both these circuits were carried on steel poles.
In the spring, as American responsibilities for railway communications
increased, selective ringing equipment was installed on the
[372]

dispatch circuit. Additional voice lines were constructed to carry
Persian-language railway traffic and by year's end two grounded telegraph
circuits, with drops at intermediate stations, provided additional facilities
for train dispatching. Two complete circuits, built through the tunnel sector
from Andimeshk to Dorud, were extended to Tehran. Whereas in early 1943 the
teletype taken over from the British constituted virtually all the teletype
then in use by American agencies in the command, the end of the year found
teletype, thanks to increased wire facilities, carrying the burden of
communication within the command.

The theft of wire by tribesmen or roving independents with an eye for quick
profits became critical. Arrangements were concluded in May 1943 for patrol of
railway wire lines by Indian infantry under British command. A supplementary
force of Iranian gendarmes was assigned to help patrol the wires, but even
this was not sufficient to curb thefts. In the spring of 1944 the situation
became so critical that arrangements were made to have units of the Iranian
Army help guard certain sections of the line. Thefts continued in spite of
increased precautions and, though the extent of impairment to MRS operations
as a whole does not show in available records, theft of railway wire must have
composed a substantial portion of the total of 219,033 feet of army wire
reported stolen in the period from 1 October 1943 to 30 September 1944.69
Installation of electrical shock devices to discourage thieves failed when the
natives began to use ropes to break t1fle wire. Next tried, and more
effective, was the "tattle-tale" system which gave instant warning of
interrupted circuits.

Local Procurement

The Purchasing Section established in the MRS effected many improvements in
local procurement methods employed by the ISR. Some time-consuming routines
which grew out of the formality of Iranian business practice were eliminated,
and a purchase order form was introduced that cut down the number of weeks
required to handle documents. Commodity price charts were made and price
trends of important commodities reported weekly; these records were used as
guides in awarding large orders and preventing overpayment. Several ISR
employees were arrested for thieving.

Procedure in procuring railway maintenance supplies was a problem early in
1944. At that time the War Department suggested that such supplies be procured
from American lend-lease goods delivered to the Iranian Government. That is,
the Iranian Government would
[373]

request needed supplies through American lend-lease; then they would be made
available to the MRS for use on the railway. The command had already
established a steady, dependable source for railway maintenance supplies which
involved passing requisitions through Army channels in the United States. The
cost of the supplies was in turn paid by the ISR. This repayment procedure was
already quite complicated since it involved dealing with both ISR officials
and the British Army. General Connolly protested the new War Department
proposal, insisting that to change the procedure of procuring supplies and to
require the Army to procure them via lend-lease to the Iranian Government
would threaten the success of his mission. He added that the officials in
Washington could not realize the consequences of introducing Iranian politics
and local customs of trade, barter, and ethics into procurement. Connolly
described his efforts to obtain railroad ties locally as the equivalent of a
nightmare. First, there was the railroad, which of course was government
owned; then, there was the Iranian Minister of Communications, under whom the
railroad nominally operated; and finally, there was the Minister of
Agriculture, from whom permits to cut lumber were obtained. The effort to
purchase the ties had begun in September 1943; no deliveries had been made by
February 1944, largely because certain individuals in each of the three
agencies were interested in obtaining what were called their perquisites. The
delay caused the procurement officer of the command to buy ties on the open
market, turn them over to the railroad, and request reimbursement. Had it not
been for the red tape involved, American lend-lease could have been used to
supply the ISR. General Connolly's plea, "Without the railroad the mission of
the PGC fails," was heeded and he was allowed to continue procuring railway
maintenance supplies from his normal source in the United States, the
Charleston Port of Embarkation.70

Accounting

Examination of the ISR accounts revealed practices which struck the Americans
as both unfamiliar and unconventional. As no reconciliation of bank statements
with the railway's books had been made in two years, the ISR's true bank
balance was unknown. Deposits were taken to the bank about once every three
months. The monthly summarized cash statement consumed twenty days in
preparation; errors were numerous; the accounts were about a year in
arrears.71
[374]

This situation was of concern to those in MRS who had to keep the record
straight. Four railroad accounting officers were therefore requisitioned from
the United States and accountants transferred from headquarters. To remedy
chaotic accounting for materials and supplies, the MRS Accounting Section in
August 1943 introduced centralized material accounting at Tehran. It also
introduced a new timekeeping system in the ISR Traction Department by which
employees were paid only for time worked.

An innovation which paid off in increased efficiency was the introduction of
American waybills for freight carried over the ISR system, Tehran and south.
These ensured trustworthy delivery records for goods and provided for accurate
accounting of both cargoes and cars. Delivery was expedited and pilferage
reduced by eliminating the possibility of cars containing valuable merchandise
going astray. In anticipation of final accounting, a project undertook to
abstract all waybills prepared at ISR stations since the beginning of the
movement of Allied traffic.

Banking procedures were improved by reconciliation of ISR books (in both the
Bookkeeping Department and the Cash Office) with the Bank Melli statements.
Deposits were made three times a week and, through better methods, the time
required for the preparation of the monthly summarized cash statement was
reduced from twenty to five days per month and its accuracy increased.
Likewise, the system of clearing cashiers, which had formerly taken two to
three months, was reduced to five days.

The Last Months

The third year of American operation opened with rather large tonnages; but
February and the succeeding three months saw the reduction of Russian-aid
cargoes to minor proportions. After March 1945 petroleum products furnished
the principal freight. Shop operations decreased proportionately with freight
curtailment, though car and engine repair continued until American operations
ceased. Effective 10 April the monthly aid-to-Russia target for the MRS was
reduced to 60,000 long tons of dry cargo and 40,000 long tons of POL. In
addition, internal cargo was lowered to 50,000 long tons.72

On 25 May the commanding general of the PGC was authorized to announce that,
as of 1 June 1945, the mission of his command would be accomplished. That
meant an early end to MRS. After some weeks
[375]

of special training of railway personnel, chiefly Iranian, the physical return
of control to Headquarters, PAI Force, Baghdad, was accomplished as of 25
June. The British lost little time after receiving the railway from the MRS in
handing it over to the Iranian Government. From the time of handover, all
northbound freight for the USSR and PGC was carried under Iranian operation.
On 15 July the 3d Military Railway Service was discontinued. Its remaining
dutiesdirection of details of handover and disposal of locomotives and rolling
stock-were assigned to a new Military Railway Division of the general staff at
headquarters.73

Numerous documents covering the transfer both of the railway as a whole and of
constituent parts and embodying detailed exhibits of fixed assets were duly
signed. These documents reflected the complicated nature of the financial
problems involved in American operation and return to British control. The
instruments of transfer stated that the United States, having received the
railway properties from the British on 1 April 1943, returned them plus
additions ( regardless of the nation or agency making them or paying for
them). They further stated that the British agreed that improvements made by
them were returned by the United States in good order; that improvements made
by the U.S. Army were received on a temporary loan with permission to transfer
them to Iran on a care, use, and maintenance basis until final disposal; and
that handover of operational responsibilities in no way prejudiced the rights
of the U.S. Government relative to fixed assets or equipment "and that final
settlement therefor will be made as agreed upon by the parties hereto in the
future."74

Additions to the capital structure of tile ISR subsequent to 1 April 1943 fell
into three categories: those financed through the ISR's own capital budget,
those financed by the British through the medium of MRS work orders, and those
financed by the United States by means of construction directives issued by
the command. The first of these categories comprised projects required by the
normal expansion of the railway. The others were projects essential to
furtherance of the Allied war effort.75 Instances arose where it was difficult
to draw the line. In many, improvements needed to carry cargoes to the
Russians remained with the ISR.
[376]

The railway had responded well to the demands the war laid upon it; and, while
fulfilling the Anglo-American commitment to the USSR, it did not fail as the
essential artery of Iran's economy. In the year before the occupation the ISR
had carried 460,000 passengers and 205,000,000 ton miles of freight. In 1943,
under MRS operation, it carried, wholly additional to its work for the Allies,
710,000 Iranian passengers and 625,000,000 ton miles of Iranian civil
freight.76

During the last months of MRS operations effort was made to bring the ISR and
its equipment to the highest possible pitch of fitness for postwar use.
Concern for the Iranian economy after the war was not lacking in the
consultations which preceded the handover. The Secretary of State notified
Ambassador Wallace Murray at Tehran in June 1945 that the British desired that
the railway be left capable of handling 50,000 long tons a month. Murray
replied that, with its own property and what he understood the American
command planned to leave behind, capacity would exceed 87,000 long tons per
month. By letter of 11 July the Acting Secretary of State reminded the
Secretary of War of the commitment on economic assistance subscribed to by the
United States in the Declaration of Tehran. Action subsequently taken provided
the ISR with rolling stock sufficient to accommodate 50,000 long tons per
month.77

Many factors were responsible for the success of the American railway
operation. Among them the availability in ample supply of the finest equipment
and rolling stock, as used by ingenious and resourceful men who gained
valuable experience on the spot, must rank foremost. Improvement in operative
and administrative methods, the help extended to the Russians in tightening
car turnaround, and, by no means least, the success achieved in winning the
indispensable support of native workmen through patient instruction and fair
labor administration-these, too, rate high. But when all is added up, the sum
spells an intangible: a rugged will to see the job through.

If a single thread can be discerned running through the complicated story, it
is the determination to achieve efficient operations at almost any cost of
effort and treasure. Handicapped throughout by the indeterminate status of the
American force in Iran, the Americans sought consistently to cut through
knotty questions of financial and command authority and responsibility. In
several instances efforts made in the
[377]

field to obtain or to assert a larger degree of direct control over their
operations than seemed intended by the Combined Chiefs' directive were
restrained by Washington. Notable among these were Connolly's arrangement with
Wilson to assume entire responsibility for railway security; his willingness
to take on additional financial burdens in order to simplify operating
controls; and his readiness to carry the whole railway burden from Gulf to
Caspian.

On the other hand, when the long-drawn-out negotiations over status and
prerogatives proved fruitless, General Connolly, .though he joined with
Iranians, British, and Russians in conversations to clarify these matters,
preferred, so far as the railway was concerned, to rock along with no more
exact definition of his powers than was contained in the April 1943 movements
agreement with the British. Though cooperation rather than unified command was
the hard way, the results proved that it was enough.
[378]