To the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
As Prepared for Delivery on
March 3, 1999


Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is a pleasure to appear before this Committee again to discuss
what intelligence is doing to anticipate, assess, and counter the
threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
vehicles. DCI George Tenet has emphasized in his appearances before
Congress that no issue better illustrates the new challenges,
complexities, and uncertainties that we in the Intelligence
Community face than the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.

Among these, Biological Weapons (BW) pose, arguably, the most
daunting challenge for intelligence collectors and analysts.
Conveying to you an understanding of the work we do to combat this
threat is best dealt with in closed session, and I welcome the
opportunity to return to answer all of the Committee's questions in
detail in such a setting.

There are some observations and trends, however, that I can
highlight in this unclassified setting. I have provided a statement
for the record, but with your permission I will note some key
points:

First, the preparation and effective use of BW by both potentially
hostile states and by non-state actors, including terrorists, is
harder than some popular literature seems to suggest. That said,
potential adversaries are pursuing such programs, and the threat
that the United States and our allies face is growing in breadth
and sophistication.

Second, we in intelligence are trying to get ahead of those
challenges by increasing the resources devoted to the BW problem,
by recruiting and training the next generation of BW intelligence
analysts and collectors, and by developing a sound Community- wide
strategy designed to encourage sophisticated approaches to
penetrating and understanding the threat.

Third, we recognize that much of the relevant wisdom in this field
is outside the traditional national security community. We are
forging new partnerships not only within that traditional
community, but also beyond. This is to ensure that we can tap into
the best minds and techniques available to us in this country in
order to understand the cutting edge of biotechnology and the
assistance it can render in comprehending and ameliorating
potential threats.

Fourth, many of these efforts will not begin to have a full impact
on our intelligence capabilities for months or even years. There
are, and there will remain, significant gaps in our knowledge. As
Director Tenet pointed out in his worldwide threat testimony,
there is a continued and growing risk of surprise.

Sources of the BW Threat: State Actors

The development, possession, and use of BW weapons are banned by
domestic law and international treaty. The United States and other
concerned governments are working hard to combat proliferation.
Nonetheless, the number of players possessing or seeking to
clandestinely acquire biological weapons is substantial.

About a dozen states, including several that are hostile to Western
democracies-Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria-now either
possess or are actively pursuing offensive BW capabilities for use
against their perceived enemies, whether internal or external.
Some countries are pursuing an asymmetric warfare capability and
see biological weapons as a viable means to counter overwhelming
US conventional military superiority.

Several states are also pursuing BW programs for counterinsurgency
use and tactical applications in regional conflicts, increasing
the probability that such conflicts will be deadly and
destabilizing.

As an example, let us look briefly at Iraq's BW program.
Initiated in 1985, the program rapidly escalated from research and
development to production and weaponization, constituting a
potential threat to allied forces during the Gulf War.

After four-and-one-half years of claiming that it had conducted
only "defensive research" on biological weapons, Iraq finally
admitted in 1995 that it had produced a half million liters of BW
agents, such as anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin.
The United Nations' Special Commission (UNSCOM) believes that Iraq
produced substantially greater amounts - three to four times
greater.

We are concerned that Baghdad retains a small BW weapons
capability and may resurrect a robust offensive BW program within
weeks if there is no viable inspection regime in place.

Sources of the BW Threat: Non-State Actors

Beyond state actors, there are a number of terrorist groups seeking
to develop or acquire BW capabilities. This biological threat, to
include some poisons, is growing. Some such groups-like Usama bin
Ladin's-have international networks, adding to uncertainty and the
danger of a surprise attack.

There are fewer constraints on non-state actors than on state
actors. Adding to the unpredictability are the "lone militants," or
the ad hoc groups here at home and abroad who may try to conduct a
BW attack.

An Expanding Threat

One disturbing trend that numbers alone do not reveal is that BW
programs are becoming more dangerous in a number of ways.
First: As deadly as they now are, BW agents could become even more
sophisticated. Rapid advances in biotechnology present the prospect
of a wholly new array of toxins or live agents that will require new
detection methods and preventative measures, including vaccines and
therapies.

Researchers are exploring different ways to use BW, including
mixtures of slow- and fast- acting agents, and "cocktails" with
chemical agents.

Gains in genetic engineering are making it increasingly difficult
for us to recognize all the agents threatening us. Also, BW attacks
need not be directed only at humans. Plant and animal pathogens may
be used against agricultural targets, creating potential economic
devastation.

Second: BW programs are becoming more self-sufficient, challenging
our detection and deterrence efforts, and limiting our interdiction
opportunities. Iran is a case in-point. Tehran-driven in part by
stringent international export controls-has set about acquiring the
ability to produce domestically the raw materials and equipment
needed to support indigenous biological agent production.
Third: Countries are taking advantage of denial and deception
techniques, concealing and protecting BW programs. Concealment is
relatively simple with BW because of its overlap with legitimate
research and commercial biotechnology.

Even supposedly "legitimate" facilities can readily conduct
clandestine BW research and can convert rapidly to agent production,
providing a mobilization or "breakout" capability. As a result,
large stockpiles of BW munitions simply may not be required in
today's BW arena.

Fourth: Advances are occurring in dissemination techniques, delivery
options, and strategies for BW use. We are concerned that BW-capable
countries are acquiring advanced technologies to design, test, and
produce highly effective BW munitions and sophisticated delivery
systems, such as cruise missiles and short-range ballistic missiles.

I should add that, while popular culture can explore the potential
BW threat, actually developing and using an effective biological
weapon poses certain technological challenges-a detailed
discussion of which is probably not appropriate in today's open
forum. However, let me provide one example that I believe
illustrates my point. The Aum Shinrikyo-before its relatively
successful 1995 sarin attack on Tokyo's subway-failed in at least
three apparent attempts to carry out biological attacks probably
because of poor dissemination.

Two other phenomena complicate the problem. First, scientists with
transferable know- how continue to leave the former Soviet Union,
some potentially for destinations of proliferation concern. And,
second, the struggle to control dual-use technologies only gets
harder. A few individuals are ready to take advantage of this and
are ready to transform opportunities for human betterment into
threats of human destruction.

We are concerned that Russia's current economic woes could
exacerbate the "brain drain" problem. By importing talent and buying
technology, state and non-state actors can make dramatic leaps
forward in all the areas I just mentioned, including the development
of new agents and delivery systems, a much earlier achievement of
indigenous capabilities, and more sophisticated denial and deception
techniques. In short, bad actors can purchase the invaluable
advantage of "technological surprise." As you know, plugging this
brain drain and helping to provide alternative courses for the
former Soviet Union's WMD infrastructure are key goals of US
nonproliferation policy, as well as a variety of US and
international cooperation programs with Russia and other former
Soviet states. We should also note in this context the importance of
international norms against the pursuit of biological weapons, such
as those embodied in the Biological Weapons Convention.
Regarding the dual-use problem: The same technology that is used for
good today, can, if it falls into the wrong hands, be used for evil
tomorrow. The overlap between BW agents and vaccines, and between
nerve agents and pesticides is, as you know, considerable. The
technologies used to prolong our lives and improve our standard of
living can quite easily be used to cause mass casualties. BW
technology is, in part, widely available because all societies have
a legitimate need for the biotechnology on which it is based.
I would offer one footnote on the difficulty of assessing the threat
from biological weapons today: Intelligence is all about
ascertaining not only the capabilities, but also the intentions of
one's adversaries. Because of the dual utility of the technology and
expertise involved, the actual BW threat is in fact tied directly to
intentions. Getting at this intent is the hardest thing for
intelligence to do, but it is essential if we are to determine with
certainty the scope and nature of the global biological warfare
threat.

The Intelligence Community Response

Let me now get to what the DCI likes to refer to as "the meat in the
sandwich" and say a few words about what the Intelligence Community
is doing to address the global BW proliferation problem and to use
our available resources in the best way possible.

An important step in boosting the Intelligence Community's WMD
nonproliferation efforts across the board occurred a little more
than a year ago, when the DCI reorganized the nonproliferation
intelligence community and increased the size of the
Nonproliferation Center:

He appointed me to be his Special Assistant for Nonproliferation
and Director of his Nonproliferation Center (NPC) to oversee the
US Intelligence Community's efforts. Specifically, he charged me
with improving coordination and communication, empowering me with
the means to lash up the nonproliferation community to better meet
the growing need for intelligence on weapons of mass destruction
programs.

The DCI significantly increased the size of the Center. Nearly all
of the analysts in CIA's Directorate of Intelligence who were
covering biological and chemical weapons, all of the proliferation
specialists dealing with missiles and nuclear technology, and all
of the analysts investigating the proliferation supplier networks
were brought into NPC. A major reason for increasing the size of
the Center was to provide a critical mass of experts to grow and
nurture the next generation of BW and CW analysts and collectors.
Speaking of the "next generation," a top strategic priority for NPC,
and all of us in the nonproliferation intelligence community, is
analysis--especially the steps needed to promote analytical depth
and expertise. We have a strong front line, but we need a deeper
bench. To that end, we are adding significant numbers of analysts
and taking innovative measures to help these analysts cope with the
fire hose of information that is out there. Our future effectiveness
will rest heavily on taking new directions in information technology
and information management.

I would note, also, that it would be impossible and inadvisable to
try to put all of the IC's resources on this issue within a single
center, given the sheer breadth of the nonproliferation issue. The
strength of the Community's nonproliferation effort depends not just
on the success of the DCI Nonproliferation Center, but on our
ability to forge effective partnerships with a variety of
organizations. This is particularly true for the analysis of
biological weapons, where the steps we have taken include:

Our enticement last fall of one of the leading virologists in the
United States to start work as the DCI's Senior Science and
Technology Advisor for Nonproliferation.

Through the efforts of this individual, we have assembled an
outside Panel of outside top scientists, technical administrators,
and senior individuals from academia, private industry, the
national labs, the military, and the public health services to
give strategic advice to the DCI.

We are increasing representation from DIA, FBI, NSA, NIMA, the Air
Force, Navy, and other agencies throughout the Center's operations
and management, while also increasing the rotation of NPC analysts
out into the Community.

We are developing new tools and new approaches for analysts that
are beginning to bear fruit. We are employing new funds and
seeking new opportunities to combat proliferation across the
board, including seeking the help of outside experts to attack the
issue of proliferation surprise.

And, we are enhancing cooperation within the Intelligence, Policy,
Defense, Law Enforcement, and Public Health Communities to counter
nuclear, biological, chemical, and even radiological terrorism.
Under the auspices of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
and working through the Nonproliferation Center, the Intelligence
Community began last year to revise and strengthen our goals to
combat worldwide BW programs. Currently, we are refining and
implementing this strategic plan. The effort is built on the
following key objectives:

To increase coordination, cooperation, communication, and
partnerships;
To improve collection and analysis capabilities and effectiveness;
To expand and focus Community R&D;
To enhance interactive computer models, databases, and tools, and
To increase opportunities for biotechnology training to enhance
expertise against BW proliferation.

Even as recently as yesterday (Tuesday, 2 March 1999), I co-chaired
with the FBI a joint meeting of the Intelligence Community's
Nonproliferation Committee and the Intelligence Subgroup of the
Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness Working Group for PDD- 62.
We brought together agencies responsible for law enforcement,
intelligence, policy, defense, and consequence management to ensure
that we were effectively working together.

As the strategy and implementation plan is finalized, Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence General Gordon will review the
recommended actions with the Community's Program Managers and also
with the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Conclusion

In closing, let me reiterate our concern regarding the proliferation
of biological weapons worldwide. This concern should, and does,
motivate us all to do everything we can to counter the threat and to
defend against it. Our efforts have received a tremendous boost from
the support we have received here on the Hill to provide funding for
a number of measures that will strengthen our intelligence
capabilities. The DCI has launched a Strategic Direction initiative
that will strengthen our clandestine collection and analytical work
by putting more operations officers on foreign streets and more
analysts on accounts, and then support them to the hilt with the
best tools available.

I believe that the changes we have made or are implementing will
enhance the overall effectiveness of the Intelligence Community in
managing and expanding our efforts to support US national
nonproliferation goals. Although many steps have been taken to
improve our understanding of the threat, we cannot guarantee that we
will be able to anticipate or collect against every military action
or terrorist act involving BW. There is more that needs to be done,
and we will work with this Committee on the next steps. Although the
growing BW threat cannot be met by US Intelligence alone, our work
will be crucial to defending American interests and protecting
American lives.